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Assessing Amateurism in College
Sports
Casey E. Faucon*
Abstract
College sports generate approximately $8 billion each year
for the National C[artel] Athletic Association and its member
institutions. Most of this revenue flows from lucrative television
broadcasting deals, which often incorporate the right to
commercialize and sell the names, images, and likenesses of
college athletes. Under its current revenue scheme,
student-athletes—85 percent of whom live below the poverty
line—receive a share of zero. For over a century, we’ve justified
this exploitative distribution scheme under a cloak of
student-athlete “amateurism.” Antitrust challenges to the
NCAA’s amateurism rules clash with the assumption that
“amateurism” is a revered tradition and an important tenet
upholding the value and integrity of U.S. college sports. But is
this true? Is amateurism in U.S. college sports such hallowed
ground? And, if so, what values should animate the distinctions
society values between collegiate and professional sports? Does it
mean college athletes shouldn’t get paid?
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and commenting on previous versions of the draft. Thank you to the editors of
the Washington & Lee Law Review, who have spent countless hours editing
and working with me to publish the Article. Thank you to my research
assistant Joey Parsons, UA J.D. 2021 for his invaluable and insightful
research.
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This Article provides a descriptive and theoretical
examination of the consumer justifications for amateurism in
college sports under an antitrust framework. In general response
to these inquiries, this Article finds that some consumer value
exists in maintaining amateurism in college sports. However,
amateurism’s uniqueness to American culture, and the values
that should shape amateurism’s norms, stem from regional and
institutional loyalty, athletic tradition, and the preparation and
life skills gained from dual academic-athletic participation.
Although competitive balance and fairness could be an
animating factor, insufficient support for this position exists.
This Article then theorizes that allowing name, image, and
likeness (NIL) commercialization or “pay for play” would not
impact those main animating factors and that student-athletes
should be allowed as much pay for play as the consumer market
would tolerate.
The Article then proposes pay for play and NIL
commercialization schemes that more robustly incorporate not
only consumer preference, but also moral, ethical, and equitable
considerations, following the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in
NCAA v. Alston.
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INTRODUCTION
Alabama freshman football player Ga’Quincy “Kool-Aid”
McKinstry has always been a bit eccentric. Growing up around
the Birmingham, Alabama area, the five-star defensive
cornerback goes by the name “Kool-Aid,”1 a moniker his
grandmother gave him because he “entered the world with a
smile,”2 like “the Kool-Aid man.”3 In August 2021, the flavored
drink company Kool-Aid announced McKinstry as its new brand
athlete,4 and the team officially updated McKinstry’s team
roster name to Kool-Aid McKinstry.5 While a notable
endorsement, McKinstry’s partnership with Kool-Aid is just one
among many, often lucrative, new deals by which
student-athletes can now profit off their names, images, and
likenesses (NILs).6

1. Alex Scarborough, Alabama Crimson Tide Freshman Ga’Quincy
‘Kool-Aid’ McKinstry Signs NIL Deal with Drink Company, ESPN (Aug. 18,
2021), https://perma.cc/DB78-7EA9.
2. Nick Kelly, Alabama Football Freshman Kool-Aid McKinstry Lands
NIL Partnership with Kool-Aid, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Aug. 18, 2021, 9:40 AM),
https://perma.cc/ZV6V-5BAU.
3. Blake Toppmeyer, The Tasty Backstory Behind Kool-Aid McKinstry’s
Endorsement Deal with Kool-Aid, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Aug. 20, 2021, 11:48
AM), https://perma.cc/X9ZL-SB5E.
4. Scarborough, supra note 1.
5. Kool-Aid
McKinstry,
ALA.
FOOTBALL
ROSTER
(2021),
https://perma.cc/5LNU-HST3.
6. See Bill Bender, NIL Tracker: Which College Athletes Are Signing
Endorsement Deals?, SPORTING NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/PT65ZTLN (tracking “[w]hich student-athletes [took] advantage of early NIL
deals”); Russell Steinberg, The Most Fascinating NIL Deals in College Sports
So Far, BOARDROOM (Aug. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/3BN6-B7BU
(highlighting noteworthy NIL deals).
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For years, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) denied student-athletes access to this marketplace
through its enforcement of eligibility rules that allegedly
maintained the Principle of Amateurism in college sports.7
These amateurism rules generally prohibited payment to
student-athletes in the forms of both “pay for play” and profiting
from NIL commercialization.8 Instead, the approximate
$8 billion in industry revenue flowed to the NCAA and its
member institutions, but the student-athletes—the most
valuable input to the college sports consumer market—received
a share of zero.9 Although it may be in society’s and the players’
best interests to continue to uphold and maintain some form of
amateurism in college sports,10 public sentiment demonstrates
increasing dissatisfaction with how inequitably the NCAA and
its member institutions distribute the largesse of its cartel
spoils.11 The Principle of Amateurism is merely a guise through

7. See NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, § 12.01.1 (2021) [hereinafter
NCAA MANUAL], https://perma.cc/5XLP-5PLJ (PDF) (“Only an amateur
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a
particular sport.”).
8. See id. § 12.1.2.
9. See Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, The National Collegiate
Athletic Association Cartel: Why It Exists, How It Works, and What It Does, 52
REV. INDUS. ORG. 185, 189 (2018).
10. For the vast majority of college athletes, a bachelor’s degree is far
more valuable—and realistic—than the prospect of a professional sports
career. See Beth Daley, Let’s Get Real with College Athletes About Their
Chances of Going Pro, CONVERSATION (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:47 PM),
https://perma.cc/DB6P-ST9X (“Given that only 1 in 4,233 high school players
go from high school to college to the pros, there is a giant gap between college
players’ dreams and reality.”); see also Tim Stobierski, Average Salary by
Education Level: The Value of a College Degree, NE. UNIV. (June 2, 2020),
https://perma.cc/M88Q-AUZR (sharing that in 2019, Americans with
bachelor’s degrees earned, on average, $64,896 while those with just a high
school diploma earned, on average, $38,792 (citing Learn More, Earn More:
Education Leads to Higher Wages, Lower Unemployment, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STATS. (May 2020), https://perma.cc/VL97-72W5)).
11. See Jon Solomon, NCAA Expert: 69 Percent of Public Opposes Paying
College
Players,
CBS SPORTS
(June
25,
2014,
11:51
AM),
https://perma.cc/L5RT-QGUV (citing a 2013 survey reporting that “69 percent
of the public and 61 percent of sports fans oppose paying college athletes”).
However, according to a 2019 poll, “[t]wo-thirds of adults say college athletes
should be allowed to earn money from endorsements and sponsorships and
half say athletes at colleges and universities with major athletic programs
should receive a share of revenue received from broadcast rights.”
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which the NCAA continues to justify this inequity and maintain
its cartel control—leaving the student-athletes, their families,
their futures, and society at large for the worse.12
Resulting from numerous social, political, cultural, and
economic catalysts, California presented the first state
challenge to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism.13 Receiving
public support from prominent sports figures like LeBron
James,14 California’s “Fair Pay to Play” Act15 allows
student-athletes to profit off their NILs, as well as hire licensed
agents and attorneys.16 Although not without its flaws,17 many
praised the California Act’s September 2019 passage as both
aggressive virtue signaling18 and progress toward remedying a
system sharply criticized as unfairly exploitative of the labor
and likenesses of student-athletes.19 Setting off a flurry of
movement in state legislatures nationwide, 2020 and 2021 saw
Compensation for Collegiate Athletes, UNIV. OF CHI. NAT’L OP. RSCH. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/AB7S-JUDM.
12. See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE
CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 3 (Univ. Mich. Press 1995)
(lambasting the NCAA’s amateurism system as “biased against human nature
and simple fairness”); Michael Steele, Comment, O’Bannon v. NCAA: The
Beginning of the End of the Amateurism Justification for the NCAA in
Antitrust Litigation, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 512 (2015) (“Big-time college
football and basketball are now multi-billion dollar industries, and to pretend
that these student-athletes are amateurs is nonsense.”).
13. See Tyler Tynes, The Ripple Effects of California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play’
Act, RINGER (Oct. 11, 2019, 6:55 AM), https://perma.cc/7PUC-KNHP.
14. Michael Shapiro, LeBron James Calls for Support of California
Student Athlete Compensation Bill, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sep. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9XMA-P992.
15. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part II; Steven A. Bank, The Olympic-Sized Loophole in
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 109, 112 (2020)
(arguing that the Act is unlikely to result in revenue sharing for
student-athletes).
18. “It’s going to change college sports for the better by having now the
interest, finally, of the athletes on par with the interests of the institutions,”
said California’s governor, Gavin Newsom. LeBron James Celebrates
California Law Allowing College Athletes to Make Money, GUARDIAN (Sep. 30,
2019, 11:30 AM), https://perma.cc/9FA8-UDDT.
19. See @NancySkinnerCA, TWITTER (Sep. 30, 2019, 12:31 PM),
https://perma.cc/LRE9-2X3N (“For decades, college sports has generated
billions for all involved except the very people most responsible for creating
the wealth. That’s wrong.”).
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twenty-nine states pass laws allowing student-athletes to
receive compensation for the commercialization of their NILs.20
These state acts take direct aim at the NCAA’s rules
enforcing the Principle of Amateurism in college sports, rules
which the U.S. Supreme Court and circuit courts have too often
deemed
presumptively
reasonable
against
antitrust
challenges.21 Although the NCAA has shifted its position with
respect to NIL commercialization,22 it continues to cling to the
position that it enjoys “broad leeway” in enforcing its rules
prohibiting and limiting activities falling within the purview of
“pay for play.”
The NCAA maintained this position in its appeal to the
Supreme Court in 2021’s NCAA v. Alston.23 In Alston, the Ninth
Circuit held that the NCAA’s rules that limit scholarships are
both subject to and violate antitrust laws.24 The decision also
allowed for unlimited scholarships to student-athletes as long as
20. Five states passed legislation similar to California’s in 2020. Citing a
need to stay competitive, forty states introduced fair pay-for-play acts, with
nineteen passing. Andrew Smalley, Student-Athlete ‘Pay for Play’ Gets
Lawmakers’ Attention, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/G6ML-HF5B. A majority of the states acting in 2021 include
those in the Southwest and Southeast. Id. Numerous states have legislation
introduced or pending. Id. The regional area with the least amount of
movement is in the Midwest and far Northeast. Id.
21. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(a)(2) (West 2020) (stating the
NCAA may not enforce rules that accord with its amateurism principle), with
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984) (endorsing amateurism
as procompetitive because “[i]n order to preserve the character and quality of
the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and
the like”).
22. See NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION
WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2020) [hereinafter
NCAA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS], https://perma.cc/W635-FQ9W (PDF).
23. 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30, Alston,
141 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 20-520), 2020 WL 6162022 (opposing “annual ‘academic
achievement’ cash payments of at least $5600 to every student-athlete in the
affected classes”).
24. Compare In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1257 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he NCAA is not entitled to a presumption
that its restraints are procompetitive.” (citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d
1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015))), with Agnew v. NCAA., 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir.
2012) (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are . . . procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics.” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117
(1984))).
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those costs are related to education and academics.25 The
Supreme Court’s decision not only affirmed the actions of the
circuit court and district court, but also clarified that the
NCAA’s amateurism rules do not, in fact, enjoy “broad leeway”
and a “quick” judicial “look” under federal antitrust laws.26
Instead, these rules are subject to antitrust’s more scrupulous
rule of reason analysis, which the lower court properly applied.27
Finding no error in the district court’s weighing of the evidence
within that more thorough rule of reason framework, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding that the
NCAA could not prevent schools from providing scholarships
that include the full cost of attendance as long as those expenses
are related to education and academics.28
The Supreme Court’s decision did much to solidify the
doctrinal implications of the NCAA’s amateurism rules under
an antitrust rule of reason analysis, but the Court did not
answer—nor was the question before it to answer—the scope
and meaning of “amateurism” in the U.S. college sports market
for antitrust’s rule of reason analysis purposes.29 While Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence berated the NCAA for cartel-like
behavior and its failure to provide a meaningful definition of
“amateurism” to define its impact in the relevant consumer
market, the Court did not define the term, leaving the question
of fact open.30
While fairer NIL profit distribution might appease public
and political dissatisfaction with student-athlete exploitation
for now, the current doctrinal approaches and legislative
strategies rely on a potentially faulty antitrust analysis: that
amateurism is valued in the U.S. college sports consumer
25. In re NCAA, 958 F.3d at 1260.
26. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157.
27. See id. (concluding the “NCAA’s rules fixing wages for
student-athletes” merit rule of reason analysis rather than a quick look
because “[t]hat dispute presents complex questions requiring more than a
blink to answer”).
28. Id. at 2166.
29. See id. (endorsing the lower court’s view that resolving the
amateurism debate in college sports is important, but not appropriate for
appellate judges).
30. See id. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (dismissing the NCAA’s
assertion that its compensation rules are procompetitive as “circular and
unpersuasive”).
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market and that “not paying student-athletes is precisely what
makes them amateurs.”31 This Article challenges both parts of
that assumption: Is this Principle of Amateurism a foundational
and valued tenet of U.S. college sports? And, if so, what are the
key defining features that uphold the distinctions between
professional and collegiate sports and that consumers value?
What is it about college athletics and the student-athletes who
engage in them that drives the consumer marketplace?
Unpacking and defining the key features of “amateurism”
in U.S. college sports can assist in determining which of its
aspects have a pro (or anti) competitive basis in the relevant
consumer marketplace. The answer to this inquiry not only
informs how courts should analyze future amateurism cases
under a rule of reason analysis, but can also inform state
legislatures, the NCAA, athletic conferences, and university
athletic programs regarding how to draft more tailored NIL
commercialization and, potentially, pay-for-play rules without
impacting consumer demands.
Finding that there is some value in academic-based
collegiate athletes for all stakeholders involved, this Article
argues that the only animating factor for purposes of defining
amateurism in U.S. college sports (that society should value) is
that the student-athlete remain a fully enrolled student at the
participating university, with some limitations on those
student-athletes who have previously played their sport
professionally. On the other hand, consumers value regional and
institutional loyalty, athletic tradition, and the preparation and
life skills that dual academic-athletic participation imparts.
This Article then theorizes that allowing NIL commercialization
or pay for play would not impact those main animating factors
and that student-athletes should be allowed as much “pay for
play” as the consumer market would tolerate.32
This Article then argues that, while fair-market-based
approaches for compensating student-athletes based on the
value of their contributions to their relevant consumer market
might be more beneficial for certain individual players in certain

31.
2015).
32.

O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir.
See infra Part III.
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sports,33 a more equitable approach under current antitrust
trends and a rule of reason analysis incorporates equitable and
societal values as well. A bit surprisingly, the Supreme Court
noted in dicta that additional supporting evidence of the impact
of the NCAA’s amateurism rules on the relevant player market
(and not only the consumer market) might also be appropriate
support under a rule of reason analysis.34 Though dicta, the
inclusion of future studies measuring the impact of “pay for
play” could expand the current scope of antitrust analysis in
general to include equitable impacts, and not just
commercialized ones. Incorporating this idealized, expanded
rule of reason analysis, this Article then proposes less restrictive
pay-for-play and NIL rule alternatives.35
***
Part I of this Article first overviews the historical
development of college sports in the United States and the
regulatory institutions overseeing their rules of play. Part I then
addresses the current NCAA governance and revenue structure.
Finally, Part I discusses Sanderson and Siegfried’s 2017 work
describing the NCAA’s illicit cartel behavior and how their
model begins to break down upon reaching the profit
distribution stage. Those on the lowest rung of the
organizational hierarchy, as well as the socio-political largesse,
admonish the distribution of the cartel spoils as exploitative and
unfair.
Intercollegiate sports generate approximately $8 billion in
revenue for the NCAA and its member institutions each year,36
mainly from television broadcasting rights, which sharply
increased after 1984’s NCAA v. Board of Regents,37 thereby
subjecting commercialized intercollegiate sports to the Sherman
33. See generally Expert Report and Affidavit of Daniel A. Rascher on
Damages Class Certification, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:14-md-02541), 2016 WL
3671671; Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths About (Not) Paying
College Athletes, SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP. (2011), https://perma.cc/F34K56K7 (PDF).
34. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154 (noting that the District Court’s rule of
reason analysis considered the relevant market as a labor market for the
highest quality student-athlete).
35. See infra Part IV.
36. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 189.
37. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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Act.38 In 2015, the median intercollegiate athletics program in
the 128 schools in the Division I, Football Bowl Division
generated $48 million, which was 110 percent more than the
median of $23 million in 2004.39 Revenue for college football
teams at 2,072 colleges and universities rose from $1.89 billion
in 2003 to $4.66 billion in 2014; basketball from $1.13 billion to
$2.68 billion, respectively.40 While the long-term impacts of the
coronavirus on revenues generated by the current business
model of college sports remain unclear,41 consumer demand for
live sporting events and rapidly changing technologies, which
are often initially incorporated into and tested within sports
broadcasting,42 will likely ensure that there will continue to be
plenty of money in college sports to go around.
But the money doesn’t go to the players. While elite coaches
in forty states are the highest paid public figures in their
states,43 85 percent of student-athletes at NCAA institutions
live below the poverty line.44 The players work over forty hours
a week on their respective sports while having to maintain their
studies.45 They don’t have time for second jobs and, honestly,
most of them will never step foot inside a professional sports
38. The Board of Regents decision removed television licensing from the
exclusive purview of the NCAA and allowed conferences to negotiate television
contracts. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 121. This caused television revenues
to climb from $29 million in both 1978 and 1979 to $72 million in 1985. See D.
Kent Meyers & Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Works
Occasionally: Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, a Case
in Point, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1995).
39. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 186 n.1.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Craig Garthwaite & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, The
COVID-19 Pandemic Is Revealing the Regressive Business Model of College
Sports, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/3GDL-MXTV.
42. See, e.g., Mary H. Tolbert & D. Kent Meyers, The Lasting Impact of
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: The Football Fan Wins,
89 OKLA. BAR J. 22, 24 (2018) (explaining the direct correlation between
increased competition in broadcasting college football games and consumer
demand).
43. Charlotte Gibson, Who’s Highest-Paid in Your State?, ESPN (2019),
https://perma.cc/CK29-26VQ.
44. Study College Athletes Worth Six Figures Live Below Federal Poverty
Line, DREXEL UNIV. (Sept. 13, 2011), https://perma.cc/ZWU7-UBET.
45. Peter Jacobs, Here’s the Insane Amount of Time Student-Athletes
Spend on Practice, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 27, 2015, 11:44 AM),
https://perma.cc/5EQT-S4HT.
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arena as players after their college playing days are over.46 And
while
many
student-athletes
pedagogically
and
developmentally benefit and mature through the strict
programming and supervision of a college athletics program,47
many student-athletes report that coaches discouraged them
from engaging in activities outside of their sport,48 ill-preparing
them for a life after college that doesn’t care how well they
interact with a ball. Part II of this Article focuses on the NCAA’s
enforcement of its inequitable cartel distributions using the
façade of the Principle of Amateurism.
Part II ends with a discussion of the current state fair
pay-for-play acts as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alston/In re NCAA Antitrust Litigation, detailing how neither
go far enough in addressing the underlying question regarding
a meaningful definition of amateurism for college sports
purposes at the heart of this Article.
The commercial exploitation of these student-athletes
becomes increasingly insidious considering the racial
composition of student-athletes in an NCAA Power Five
conference. In 2018, Dr. Shaun R. Harper released an updated
study on Black male student-athletes and racial inequalities in
NCAA, Division I college sports, which includes statistics from
sixty-five universities in the Power Five conferences.49 “Black
men were 2.4% of undergraduate students enrolled at the 65
universities, but comprised 55% of football teams and 56% of
men’s basketball teams on those campuses.”50 Harper’s study
also demonstrated the lower rates at which Black male
46. Each year, approximately 1.2 percent of draft-eligible NCAA men’s
basketball players are selected in the NBA draft, while 1.6 percent of
draft-eligible football players matriculate to the NFL. Estimated Probability
of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA, https://perma.cc/29LC-HF6W
(last updated Apr. 8, 2020).
47. See, e.g., Katie Barrer, Feature Story: The “Pros” of Being a Student
Athlete, UNIV. OF OR., https://perma.cc/2PZ4-QBCU (“Learning discipline
prepares athletes for the future of a career and family life, especially when it
comes to time management.”).
48. See SHAUN R. HARPER, BLACK MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL
INEQUITIES IN NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 5 (2018),
https://perma.cc/V6XL-FKSZ
(PDF)
(“[C]oaches
prioritized
athletic
accomplishment over academic engagement and discouraged participation in
activities beyond their sport.”).
49. See id. at 2.
50. Id. at 3.
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student-athletes graduate as compared to their peers.51 These
alarming graduation rate statistics, coupled with a
programmatic culture in which high-achieving Black male
athletes report that coaches prioritized athletic accomplishment
over academic engagement, compound the inequity.52
This inequity rings especially true for the women’s athletics
participants, whose prospects for lucrative professional athletic
careers are even more slim.53 Consider UCLA gymnast Katelyn
Ohasi, who went viral in 2019 for her perfect 10.0 floor routine,54
later appearing on Good Morning America55 and in the ESPN
body issue,56 among others. She later blasted the NCAA in a
New York Times video, lamenting that she felt “handcuffed by
the NCAA rules.”57 She is now retired from gymnastics; “after
[her] final meet, [she] had no pro league to join.”58 She could
have done something as simple as post a picture with a sports
drink and an #ad notation or run a monetized YouTube channel,
profiting off her sports physique while in the limelight and with

51. See id. (“55.2 % of Black male student-athletes graduated within six
years, compared to 69.3% of student-athletes overall, 60.1% of Black
undergraduate men overall, and 76.3% of undergraduate students overall.”).
52. See id. at 4–5 (indicating that student-athletes struggle to engage
with faculty because they lack free time outside of classes and practices).
53. See Tan Boston, As California Goes, So Goes the Nation: A Title IX
Analysis of the Fair Pay to Play Act, 17 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 52 (2021)
(concluding that collegiate sports’ current landscape deepens gender
inequality). Anthony Edwards, the #1 pick in the 2020 NBA draft, will make
$10 million in his first season, while Sabrina Ionescu, the #1 pick in the 2020
WNBA draft will make just $68,000 in her rookie season. See Kurt
Badenhausen, NBA Draft 2020: Projected Contracts for Edwards, Wiseman,
LaMelo and Other First-Round Picks, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/37HX-EJQ3; James Crepea, Sabrina Ionescu Drafted by New
York Liberty with No. 1 Pick in WNBA Draft, OR. LIVE (Apr. 17, 2020, 4:15
PM), https://perma.cc/9CMN-JXRE.
54. As of March 2022, Ohasi’s routine has been viewed over 221 million
times. UCLA Athletics, Katelyn Ohashi—10.0 Floor (1-12-19), YOUTUBE (Jan.
13, 2019), https://perma.cc/C4GH-C6WW.
55. Gymnast Katelyn Ohashi Flips Pancakes for Michael and Sara, GOOD
MORNING AM. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/8U3K-AJHX.
56. Katelyn Ohasi: “I Wanted to Bring the Joy Back to Gymnastics”, ESPN
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/TJ2B-R8GU.
57. Katelyn Ohasi, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A. Career, Except
Me, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/GE32-J454.
58. Id.
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some guidance from professionals and mentors.59 Earning
money through personal and school branding on social media
could be a passive source of revenue for any student-athlete,
especially for a struggling one, whose parents will sleep on the
floor of their kids’ hotel rooms to watch them play during the
NCAA’s March Madness, a tournament which generates $900
million in revenue for the NCAA each year.60
Many proposals attempt to more fairly redistribute the
profits made off the commercial use of student-athletes’ NILs.61
These practical solutions include syphoning royalties from the
use of a student-athlete’s NIL into a trust for the student-athlete
to receive after graduation or some other definitive point,62 or
creating a clearinghouse to distribute royalties, a system which
the music industry already utilizes.63 Such solutions, while
addressing the need to compensate student-athletes for the
commercial uses of their NILs, still exist within a structure that
otherwise maintains the NCAA’s competitive restrictions
regarding pay for play under the guise of upholding the
Principle of Amateurism.64
This exploitative profit distribution scheme, which prevents
student-athletes from receiving pay for play or NIL
commercialization profits, is enshrined within Article 12 of the

59. See, e.g., Patrick Rishe, NIL Earnings: The Factors Impacting How
Much a College Athlete Can Make from Endorsements, FORBES (July 4, 2021,
8:22 PM), https://perma.cc/HK3J-6E6E (brainstorming how college athletes
can profit off NIL deals).
60. Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 54:50–55:10 (2020) (statement of George
Wrighster, III), https://perma.cc/5RU5-VQ2G.
61. See NCAA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3.
62. See Jeffrey J.R. Sundram, Comment, The Downside of Success: How
Increased Commercialism Could Cost the NCAA Its Biggest Antitrust Defense,
85 TUL. L. REV. 543, 568–69 (2010). NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers
“proposed that the endorsement income go into a trust fund from which
athletes would draw upon graduation or the completion of their eligibility.”
Ivan Maisel, The NCAA Must Again Put Athletes First, This Time Around the
NIL Debate, ESPN (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/4K29-SFKT.
63. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6753 (West 2022) (providing for the
establishment of a trust account for minor musicians).
64. See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 12, at 376 (“Collegiate
amateurism is not a moral issue; it is an economic camouflage for monopoly
practice.”).
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NCAA Bylaws.65 Article 12 regulates amateurism and
essentially provides a list of “permissible” and “impermissible”
activities concerning pay for play and NIL commercialization.66
Student-athletes are barred from doing either. Instead,
revenues flow to the NCAA and its members, who are
authorized to commercialize, advertise, and sell merchandise
using a student-athlete’s NIL.67
The right of the NCAA and its member institutions to reap
the profits from athletics revenues and to commercialize
student-athletes NILs is exclusive.68 Student-athletes can do
neither. In fact, they cannot even effectively file for trademark
protection over their own NILs while they are still active unless
they are within the last six months of their athletic
eligibility69—this does little to help younger players, like Johnny
Manziel, who received national recognition as a freshman.70
Article 12 goes even further by putting the onus on the
student-athletes and their athletics departments to protect the
NCAA’s exclusive commercial use of the student-athletes’ NILs
and to take active steps to prevent improper commercial use by
third parties or risk eligibility.71 Part II will discuss the
65. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 12.2 (Involvement with
Professional Teams); id. § 12.3 (Use of Agents); id. § 12.4 (Employment); id.
§ 12.5 (Promotional Activities); id. § 12.6 (Financial Donations from Outside
Organizations); id. § 12.11 (Ineligibility).
66. See id. § 12.5.1.1(i) (permitting NIL use for “charitable, educational
or nonprofit” purposes); id. § 12.1.2(b) (“An individual loses amateur status [if
he or she] [a]ccepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received [in the
future].”).
67. Id. § 12.5.1.1.
68. See id. § 12.5.1.1(e) (“All moneys derived from the activity or project
go directly to the institution, conference or the charitable, educational or
nonprofit agency.”).
69. Some student-athletes file on an Intent to Use basis. See Christie Cho,
Protecting Johnny Football®: Trademark Registration for Collegiate Athletes,
13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 65, 66 (2015) (using Johnny Manziel’s
trademark triumph to show that “intent to use” is “a viable means of protecting
the intellectual property interests of current student-athletes”).
70. See id. at 66–67.
71. A recent example of this process concerns former Alabama football
quarterback Tua Tagovailoa, recently picked fifth in the NFL draft by the
Miami Dolphins. One online t-shirt company in Birmingham, Alabama,
applied for a trademark registration with the USPTO for the mark
“Tua-Loosa” and was actively selling t-shirts online with that phrase. Notice
of Opposition, at ¶ 13 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88148822 (Apr.
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Principle of Amateurism, transitioning to a discussion of Article
12 of the NCAA’s Bylaws. Part II then overviews the doctrinal
interpretations of the Principle of Amateurism by chronicling
the jurisprudential development of the Principle of Amateurism
under antitrust challenges, focusing specifically on cases that
impact the case law on both pay for play and NIL
commercialization, leading to the still unanswered and murky
question about the definition of amateurism.
The NCAA’s exploitative and convoluted scheme of
amateurism rules in Article 12 is barely teetering on a
foundation of the NCAA’s supposed role as the defender (and
enforcer) of amateurism in college sports. The NCAA does have
one thing right in its writ to the Supreme Court, particularly
with regard to judicial rewriting of eligibility rules,72 which
opens up a much larger question. Each time a plaintiff
challenges the bounds of the current pay-for-play or NIL
limitations, they does so with a certain rule or limitation in
mind: providing evidence to determine, under a rule of reason
analysis, whether this particular rule violates antitrust laws
from the framework of whether consumers would tolerate it
without impacting value and revenue. While recent judicial
opinions have started to question whether the underlying
assumption that amateurism in college sports exists and is
revered,73 the evidence and studies presented do not clarify what
“amateurism” means to the public or, from a positive
perspective, which aspects of college sports society values.
Part III of this Article addresses that underlying
assumption: Is amateurism in U.S. college sports a revered and
honored tradition? If so, what aspects or facets of that definition
have an impact on consumers, society, and the players regarding
8, 2019), https://perma.cc/S7GR-QXWJ (PDF). Tua then had to file a Notice of
Opposition to this third-party trademark application. Id. But if compliance
had not monitored improper third-party usage, Tua and the university would
have risked sanctions by the NCAA.
72. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15–16, NCAA v. Alston, 141 S.
Ct. 2141 (2021) (No. 20-520), 2020 WL 6162022 (“[J]udges should not be
empowered to rewrite [NCAA amateurism rules].”); see also Gregory M.
Krakau, Monopoly and Other Children’s Games: NCAA’s Antitrust Suit Woes
Threaten its Existence, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 413 (2000).
73. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2152 (2021) (recognizing that
the district “court struggled to ascertain for itself any coherent definition of
[amateurism]” (internal quotations omitted)).
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the economic and societal value of U.S. college sports? Although
scholars and stakeholders often lament the hollow shell that is
the NCAA’s amateurism ideal, few have examined what aspects
of it, from an antitrust perspective, the law should promote and
value about it—why do we care so much about college sports?
To answer the first question simply: yes, amateurism is
revered in U.S. college sports. And some value exists in
maintaining a distinction between college and professional
sports. But the value does not lie in not paying players. The only
distinction that matters (that society should value) is that the
student-athlete remain just that—a fully enrolled student at the
participating university, with some limitations on those who
have previously played professionally within that sport for
which they play for the academic institution. Theorizing,
instead, that negative opinions about player compensation or
commercialization are not animating factors at all—consumers
value loyalty, school allegiance, student-athlete status and
representation of the school, and competition—not in the sense
of fair competition, as college football is more predictable than
the pros, but in the sense of a need to witness physical contests
and historical regional rivalries among (generally) college-aged
players.
Next, while dominant law and economics theories strip
economic rules from morality considerations, focusing solely on
economic efficiency from a consumer welfare perspective,74
Maurice Stucke argues that antitrust rules and economic
safeguards should—and in some cases already do—have a basis
in morality and what the public perceives as fair behavior.75 The
Supreme Court’s dicta regarding the potential impact on the

74. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and
Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 258 (critiquing the predominant
antitrust theory because it ignores market imperfections); Ianni Drivas,
Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, UNIV. OF CHI. SCH. OF L.
(June 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/27HE-FPN9 (“[A]ntitrust law should serve
consumer interests and . . . protect competition rather than individual
competitors.”).
75. See Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective
Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 595,
603 (2020); see also Nathan Boninger, Comment, Antitrust and the NCAA:
Sexual Equality in Collegiate Athletics as a Procompetitive Justification for
NCAA Compensation Restrictions, 65 UCLA L. REV. 754, 754 (2018) (arguing
that social welfare benefits are a legitimate procompetitive justification).
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player market supports and demonstrates this movement.76
Part IV discusses the potential for an expanded study
addressing the NCAA’s cartel control over the student-athlete
market, i.e., improper restrictions on market inputs.
Fair-market-based
approaches
for
compensating
student-athletes based on the value of their contributions to
their division might be equitable toward individual players in
certain sports, as argued by the Alston plaintiffs and previously
by others.77 But a more equitable approach under the current
antitrust framework and rule of reason analysis is to first
determine the fair market value of each student-athlete based
on sport and gender within each conference, and then equally
distribute such amounts to each eligible student-athlete within
each conference at the end of an academic year or other set
timeline. Student-athletes should also be able to commercialize
their names, images, and likenesses while enrolled in school on
both a group licensing and individual basis.
Part IV then sets out suggested proposals for distribution
(pay for play) and NIL commercialization schemes that are less
restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s current amateurism rules
under a rule of reason approach, but that more robustly
incorporate moral and equitable values as well. This Part ends
with counterarguments and suggestions for implementation
and continued inquiry.
I.

THE NCAA CARTEL, A PRIMER

You’re actually causing economic injury because
all of us have a finite time in life that we are
going to have our highest earning potential.
Sometimes it’s in your teens, sometimes it’s in
your twenties—and you should be able to
capitalize on that. You go to college to get an
education. And you also go to college to get a

76. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154 (“[T]o prevail, the plaintiff
student-athletes [need not] show that [the NCAA’s] restraints harm
competition in the seller-side (or consumer facing) market as well as in its
buyer-side (or labor) market.” (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am.
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 321 (2007))).
77. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 33, at 46.
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head start in life. So it’s completely un-American
to cut off the free market system.
George Wrighster, III78
A.

History of Collegiate Sports Regulation

The Board of Regents dicta draws on an assumption that
amateurism is a “revered tradition” of college sports in the
United States.79 But this ideal of amateurism, which in its
current form is unique to the United States, stems not from
American origins.80 This concept of amateurism was developed
by nineteenth century social elites in Britain to elevate the
upper social classes above associating with the “lower” and
“working classes.”81 As Ronald Smith points out, “It was clearly
a social class concept that did not make sense to many
Americans who lacked the sharp social class divisions so clearly
seen in British society.”82 Americans charged fees at the gates,
recruited athletes, and hired professional coaches—none of
which were considered very aristocratic, a realm in which sports
were played merely as a means of activity and entertainment.83
Aristocrats didn’t need to make money through (or pay money
for) sports.84
The first sporting contest between two universities was a
rowing competition between Harvard and Yale in 1852.85
Universities introduced sports in the late 1800s as a means to
attract students, as universities grew rapidly in number and
size during the last part of the 1800s.86 The first intercollegiate
78. Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 56:50–57:20 (2020) (statement of George
Wrighster, III), https://perma.cc/5RU5-VQ2G. Mr. Wrighster is a former
member of the National Football League Players Association Board of
Representatives and former NFL tight end. Id.
79. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
80. See RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE
ATHLETIC REFORM 57 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2011).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 58.
84. See id. at 57.
85. History, YALE UNIV. ROWING, https://perma.cc/RUD4-HVL8.
86. See GERALD GURNEY ET. AL, UNWINDING MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG
WITH COLLEGE SPORTS—AND HOW TO FIX IT 4 (2017) (“The athletic branding of
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baseball game occurred between Amherst and Williams in
1859.87 The first five-on-five basketball game was played in 1896
between the University of Chicago and the University of Iowa.88
The first intercollegiate football game occurred in 1869 between
Princeton and Rutgers.89 As Sanderson and Siegfried describe,
the development of intercollegiate football was circuitous,
initially resembling soccer, then rugby, and then finally
reaching the current and distinct “American football” style
played today.90
The first intercollegiate sports “organization” to address
“amateurism” in intercollegiate sports was in reference to the
first baseball game between Amherst and Williams in 1859.91 In
1876, students founded the Intercollegiate Football Association
and created the first Thanksgiving Day championship game in
New York City, establishing an American “Turkey Day”
tradition of football.92 In 1879, a baseball conference of students
met to discuss whether professional baseball players could play
for their universities.93 This conference included students from
Amherst, Brown, Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton, and Yale.94
Faculty became involved in the governance of
intercollegiate athletics in 1881, when Princeton created the
Committee of Athletics and Musical Activities because the
athletes and glee club members often missed class.95 A year
later, the Harvard Athletic Committee formed in 1882 with
three students, three alumni, and three faculty.96 The first
instance in which these new committees encountered the issue
universities began as early as 1869, when Charles Eliot, one of America’s
best-known educators and then in his first year as president of Harvard
University, proudly noted that Harvard excelled in the ‘manly sports.’”).
87. Daniel Wilco, The Story of the First-Ever College Baseball Game, in
1859, NCAA (July 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/GCQ9-YWS6.
88. Daniel Wilco, What We Know About the First College Basketball Game
Ever Played, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZTA7-UNXN.
89. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 193.
90. Id.
91. See SMITH, supra note 80, at 10 (“[R]ules were created between the
two schools after a challenge for a contest was made.”).
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 20–22.
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of amateurism was in relation to college baseball players,
beginning in the 1880s.97 College baseball players were hired to
work at upscale vacation resorts in the mountains or the coasts
and to play for guests’ entertainment.98
However, these organizations were principally a “debating
society for faculty representatives interested in amateur
sports.”99 Schools held the autonomy to regulate themselves
through Home Rule.100 In fact, the 1907 IAAUS Constitution
includes an amendment which provides that “[l]egislation
enacted at a conference of delegates shall not be binding upon
any institution.”101
However, from 1890 to 1905, over 300 university students
died from intercollegiate football-related injuries.102 Sanderson
and Siegfried point out that news stories played a vital role in
turning public attention toward violence and “cheating” within
the popular sport.103 This attention spurred then-President
Theodore Roosevelt to call representatives from Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton to the White House and have them promise to
reduce violence in college football.104 Following a Union College
player’s death in 1905 due to taking a hit from the New York
University offensive line’s use of a “Flying Wedge,”105 the NYU
chancellor, along with representatives from sixty-two colleges,
formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States (IAAUS).106 The IAAUS created a rules committee aimed

97. See id. at 54.
98. Id. at 54–57.
99. Id. at 51.
100. See id. at 52.
101. Id. at 52–53.
102. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 193.
103. See id. (“News reports about collegiate football deaths and injuries
threatened to undermine its continued popularity.”).
104. Roosevelt Campaign for Football Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1905,
at 1, https://perma.cc/F26J-LH5H.
105. Football Player Killed. William Moore, of Union College, Dies from
Blow on Head, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905, https://perma.cc/22PV-7NUX.
106. See ARTHUR A. FLEISCHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 39 (Univ. of Chi. Press
1992).
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at eliminating the Flying Wedge and requiring at least six
offensive players be on the line of scrimmage at the snap.107
The IAAUS needed an enforcement arm because teams
would only agree to abide by the newer, safer rules if they
believed that the other teams would as well, as ignoring them
would result in a competitive advantage.108 Even at the outset,
the IAAUS understood that its regulations impacted how
universities, coaches, and players would try to win on the field,
incorporating a “fundamental application of a game theoretic
dominant equilibrium.”109 Thus, the ability to monitor
adherence to the regulations to curb cheating in a system which
rewards winning became an integral part of the IAAUS’s
authority.110
By 1906, thirty-nine colleges had joined the IAAUS.111 Its
constitution prohibited payments to students for athletic
participation and skill, prohibited recruitment, limited player
eligibility to four years, and banned former professional
players.112 The constitution said nothing about payments to
coaches or profits to universities.113 Unsurprisingly, the NCAA
still does not limit the compensation of head coaches and
athletic directors (although in the 1990s, some assistant
basketball coaches were limited to earning $16,000).114 And the
NCAA does not limit or control institutional spending on
facilities, but it does limit recruiting costs to at least preserve
the benefits to those who can financially benefit.115

107. See id. at 39–40; Change the Football Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1893,
at 2, https://perma.cc/JD6Y-6CEQ.
108. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 193–94.
109. Id. at 194.
110. These changes in regulation to the game also spurred the creation of
“conferences.” The first multisport conference was the Southern
Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1895, which included Alabama, Auburn,
Georgia Tech, South Carolina, and University of the South (Sewanee). SMITH,
supra note 80, at 58.
111. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 194.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 197; see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998)
(striking down the $16,000 cap on assistant basketball coach annual salary as
an “unlawful restraint of trade”).
115. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 197.
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In 1910, the IAAUS changed its name to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and it had ninety-five
member universities by 1911.116 By this time, as Sanderson and
Siegfried describe, the NCAA had become “entrenched” as the
self-regulatory body over intercollegiate college sports.117 But
this regulatory body lacked teeth.
When WWI occurred, then-President Woodrow Wilson
touted the idea of college athletes becoming soldiers.118 His
Secretary of War was quoted as saying, “There are not enough
star athletes in our universities to fill our armies.”119 Such
public praise of college athletes, likening them to patriots and
ideal soldiers, contributed to the public’s perception of these
athletes as “warriors” willing to sacrifice their peak physical
years and prowess for a cause.120 College sports continued to
grow until WWII.121
A “stadium-building frenzy” occurred throughout the 1920s.
Every Big Ten member built a stadium of at least 50,000-person
capacity in the 1920s.122 Stanford funded a 60,000-person
stadium with one game against California, which it later
expanded to 90,000-person capacity.123 In 1924, Notre Dame
signed coach Knute Rockne to a ten-year, $100,000 contract.124
That same year, Stanford signed Pop Warner to the first
incentive-based contract in 1924, offering a $2,500 bonus for a
Rose Bowl appearance.125
The NCAA tried to limit paying players, introducing nine
principles of amateurism in 1922, but it lacked enforcement
ability due to schools’ continued adherence to Home Rule.126 The
now-SEC became the first conference to openly allow athletic
scholarships, which the NCAA opposed at its 1939 convention,
116. Id. at 194.
117. Id.
118. SMITH, supra note 80, at 60.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 59.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 62–63.
123. Id. at 63.
124. Id. at 65.
125. Id. at 65–66.
126. The concept of “Home Rule” was that schools would exercise
autonomy and regulate themselves. Id. at 52.
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amending the NCAA constitution to require that all financial
aid must be based on need and not athletic ability.127 Even
without the Home Rule self-enforcement tradition, the NCAA
had little enforcement power or money at that time—apparently
$10,000 in 1939 (a potential incentive to start the Men’s
Basketball Tournament that same year.)128 Despite the rule,
and with the NCAA’s lack of enforcement power, the SEC kept
giving “athletic” scholarships instead of financial-based ones.129
In 1946, the NCAA passed a “purity code,” which outlines
positions on amateurism, institutional control of athletics,
admitting athletic students on the same standards as other
students, banning off-campus recruiting, limiting scholarships
based on need and to tuition and fees, and allowing competition
only by those who adhered to the rules.130
The NCAA began to strengthen its enforcement capabilities
in 1948, when it adopted what became known as the “Sanity
Code” at the 1948 NCAA Convention.131 The Sanity Code was a
set of rules that prohibited schools from giving athletes financial
aid that was based on athletic ability and not available to
ordinary students.132 The Sanity Code also created a compliance
scheme, establishing a Compliance Committee that could
terminate an institution’s membership to the NCAA.133
According to then-President of the American Council on
Education, George F. Zook, who advocated at the 1948
convention that the NCAA should create a more centralized
organizational structure, the NCAA needed to act with
“regulatory authority” because “[m]any will vote for the code but
are figuring out ways to beat it.”134 The convention also voted to

127. See id. at 89–90.
128. See id. at 91 (“In the last few years of the 1930s, the NCAA had about
$10,000 in the bank. The NCAA basketball tournament, begun in 1939,
brought in the most money, but it was only a few thousand dollars each
year . . . .”).
129. Id. at 93.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 88.
132. See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2015) (citing Daniel E.
Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 333 (2007)).
133. Id.
134. SMITH, supra note 80, at 95.
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give the NCAA the enforcement power it needed, establishing a
“compliance committee.”135
These rules restricted player compensation to a
grant-in-aid, but the NCAA moved away from the Sanity Code
in 1956 to permit members to give, for the first time,
scholarships based on athletic ability, capped at a full “grant in
aid,” which included tuition, fees, room and board, and required
course-related books.136 This is due in part to the Southern,
SEC, and Southwestern conferences meeting and agreeing in
1949 to demand the ability to pay room, board, books, and
laundry expenses for their players, an agreement that the
University of Virginia quickly endorsed.137 The “sinful
seven”—UVA, Virginia Tech, Maryland, the Citadel, VMI,
Villanova, and Boston College—were brought before the NCAA
Compliance Committee in 1950 because of their numerous
infractions.138 The Committee voted 111-93 for expulsion, but
expulsion required a two-thirds majority.139 With bad behavior
left unpunished, the late 1940s and early 1950s saw a litany of
cheating scandals.140
But as to the issue of athletic scholarships, the NCAA
limited the number of scholarships available for a team in

135. See id. at 97 (“Through the first year of the Sanity Code, there were
few complaints of violations, as the Compliance Committee was being set up
to investigate any wrongdoers.”).
136. Id. at 96.
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id. at 98.
139. Id.
140. In 1945, while surveilling a suspected thief, the New York District
Attorney happened to discover then-powerhouse basketball school, Brooklyn
College, point-shaving. Id. at 110. In 1949, four men were arrested and
convicted for attempting to bribe GWU basketball players to fix games. Id. at
111. In 1951, five men were convicted for attempting to fix a
Minnesota-DePaul basketball game at Madison Square Garden. Id. at 112.
Also, in 1951, basketball players from the following schools were arrested for
point-shaving: City College of New York, Long Island University, New York
University, Toledo, Bradley, and national champion Kentucky. Id. These
scandals were not confined to the basketball court; in 1950, news broke that
Army football players had been receiving improper benefits and eighty-three
West Point cadets would be expelled from school, bringing an end to a six-year
span that saw the Black Knights go 57–3–4 and capture two national
championships. Id. at 113–14.
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1973.141 Football was limited to 105 scholarships, then 95 in
1978, then to 85 in 1992 (where we are today).142 In August 2014,
the NCAA announced that it would allow conferences to
increase scholarships up to the full “cost of attendance.”143
B.

The NCAA Operations

The NCAA split into Divisions I, II, and III in 1973.144
Division I includes large universities that compete at elite
levels.145 Division II schools are smaller and compete at the
intermediate level.146 Division III schools have primary
emphasis on regional in-season and conference competition.147
Division I subdivided into three groups for football: Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS) composed of 128 schools at the highest
levels, Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) composed of
approximately 120 teams that compete at a lower level, and
approximately 100 teams that have elite basketball teams but
do not play football.148 In addition to the approximately 350
Division I teams, there are about 300 teams in Division II and
450 teams in Division III.149
The NCAA is currently registered as an active, 501(c)(3)
non-profit organization with the IRS, a status which has been
sharply criticized in the social politic.150 The NCAA’s highest
governing body is the Board of Governors.151 The Board is
composed of chief executive officers who direct and oversee
141. These scholarship restrictions were driven by “the anticompetitive
intent of cost containment.” Expert Rep. of Daniel A. Rascher on Damages
Class Certification at 51, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 4:14-md-02541), 2016 WL 3671671.
142. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 194.
143. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 15.02.6 (revised 8/7/14).
144. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 194.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Unlike in Divisions I and II, student-athletes at Division III schools
cannot receive athletics scholarships. Id.
148. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 194.
149. Id.
150. NCAA, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 10 (2020),
https://perma.cc/8R4X-346D (PDF); see, e.g., George F. Will, Tax Breaks for
Football, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2006), https://perma.cc/72E2-UVD4.
151. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 4.01.1.
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issues that affect the NCAA.152 The NCAA’s website provides,
“The board is charged with ensuring that each division operates
consistently with the basic purposes, fundamental policies and
general principles of the Association.”153 The Board is currently
composed of twenty-five members, who meet once a month.154
The Board also publishes articles and resolutions passed by its
members, a few of which directly address the California Act and
investigate ways to enhance name, image, and likeness
compensation opportunities.155
The impact of “power and money” drives the NCAA’s
revenue structure.156 These revenues derive mainly from
television broadcasting contracts following the 1984 Board of
Regents case.157 That decision ended an agreement that
restricted the number of college football games for broadcasting,
pushing the prices to supra-competitive levels.158 While studies
show an initial dip in profits after this decision, the three
decades following it saw an “explosion in revenue.”159 This was
due to orchestration by the NCAA and its member institutions,
evolving demographics, and rapidly changing broadcast
technology.160
152. NCAA Board of Governors, NCAA, https://perma.cc/X6QP-Y26A.
153. Id.
154. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 4.1.1.
155. See, e.g., Board of Governors Moves Toward Allowing Student-Athlete
Compensation for Endorsements and Promotions, NCAA (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/DFN3-CPAZ (“At its meeting this week, the Board of
Governors supported rule changes to allow student-athletes to receive
compensation for third-party endorsements both related to and separate from
athletics.”).
156. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 186.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Although many people predicted that broadcast rights would decline
sharply after 1984, about $250,000 at the time, they failed to appreciate the
rapid growth of TV networks that demand football game content and the
degree to which college football demand is regional, which preserved market
power for regional conferences. Id. Before 1984, ABC and CBS—which held
the rights to televise Saturday college football—had been airing simultaneous
games rather than a single game broadcast nationally. Id. The greater appeal
of Southeastern Conference (SEC) games in the South and of Big Ten
matchups in the ‘‘rust belt’’ must have been enough to boost advertising
receipts by more than the extra cost of airing multiple games. Id. Interest in
college sports, especially football, is regional in part because many alumni of
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After Board of Regents, the Power Five conferences—the
ACC, the SEC, the Big Ten, the Big 12, and the Pac-12—added
members during the 1990s and 2000s.161 During that time, a
duopoly emerged: the College Football Association (CFA)
negotiated TV rights for teams in the SEC, the ACC, and the Big
Eight (now Big 12), plus Notre Dame and Penn State
(independents); the Big Ten and Pac-12 joined together for TV
broadcasting purposes.162 Both alliances broke down over
revenue disagreements.163 Since 1995, all Power Five
conferences negotiate TV rights on behalf of their members.164
And they have done so deftly—“parlay[ing] the regionally
parochial sports interests of their fans and the growing number
of broadcast networks that seek game content (e.g., Fox and
ESPN) relative to the number of conferences that offer games
into an ever growing financial bonanza.”165
By 2015 the sixty-five teams in the power conferences were
each earning $20 to $35 million annually from television
broadcast rights.166 Because many big-time university sports
teams play in locations where there is limited competition for
live-gate attendance and their devoted fans exhibit relatively
inelastic demands, the teams can exploit their market power in
pricing and implement price discrimination to maximize gate
receipts as well.167 While the power conferences solidified their
market power, technological developments increased the

colleges and universities reside relatively close to their alma maters, and they
and the current students constitute a substantial base demand for television
broadcasts and live attendance. Id.
161. Id. at 187.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The powerful intercollegiate athletics programs have tried to
diminish any economic competition that may have existed a few decades ago.
In 2007, as the outcome of a settlement that ended an antitrust suit between
the National Invitation Tournament (NIT) and NCAA, the NCAA purchased
the NIT, thereby ending its modest competitive threat to the NCAA’s lucrative
‘‘March Madness’’ basketball tournament. Id. at 187–88. The NAIA (National
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, which governs about 250 very small
athletics programs) has been marginalized, and women’s basketball has been
brought under the NCAA’s control. Id. at 188.
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relative value of televising events that viewers prefer to watch:
‘‘breaking news’’ and live sporting events.168 Many fans prefer to
watch a sporting event in real-time, and viewers cannot easily
avoid the commercials in live sports broadcasts.169 This
increases the relative value of advertising on live events, and
thereby allows price increases that further bolster broadcast
revenues.170 The consequence of these changes has been to
create a college commercial sports enterprise that “now
measures aggregate revenues in the billions and compensates
head coaches and some athletic directors in the millions.”171
C.

The NCAA Cartel, Examined Through Its Spoils
Distribution

Despite its tax-status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization,
the NCAA and its member institutions can maintain this
revenue scheme by engaging in illicit cartel behavior. As
Lawrence Kahn stated, “Most economists who have studied the
NCAA view it as a cartel that attempts to produce rents, both
by restricting output and limiting payments for inputs such as
player compensation.”172
The word “cartel” derives from the Italian word “cartello,”
which essentially means a leaf of paper.173 In English, the word
was used to designate a written agreement between warring
nations regarding the exchange of prisoners of war.174 Today,
the term is colloquially used to refer to gang-related and

168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. In 2021, the highest paid NCAA member football coach was
Alabama’s Nick Saban (School pay: $9,500,000; Total pay: $9,753,221). College
Football Head Coach Salaries, USA TODAY, https://perma.cc/7RSK-2X5J (last
updated Oct. 14, 2021, 9:09 AM). LSU’s Ed Orgeron was number two (School
pay: $8,387,500; Total pay: $9,012,917). Id. For NCAA men’s basketball,
Kentucky’s John Calipari was the highest paid coach (School pay: $8,000,000;
Total pay: $8,095,800) and Duke’s Mike Krzyzewski was number two (Total
pay: $7,044,221). Men’s Basketball Head Coach Salaries, USA TODAY,
https://perma.cc/FBW9-NJR6 (last updated Mar. 9, 2021, 3:21 PM).
172. Lawrence M. Kahn, Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in
College Sports, 21 J. ECON. PERSPS. 209, 210 (2007).
173. Cartel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/BSK9-44S5.
174. Id.
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organized crime.175 Economically, a cartel is a group of market
actors within an oligopoly who agree or collude with one another
to increase profits and market shares.176 While the agreement
can take many forms, cartel behavior includes price-fixing
agreements, production-output reductions to increase demand,
and fixing bidding on public projects.177
The NCAA’s economic cartel is composed of two principle
agreements: limiting the compensation and demand for players,
the “most essential input to games,” and restricting the number
of games for sale for broadcasting purposes.178 Both measures
reduce compensation below market demand.179 The result, social
scientists describe, is a “large financial surplus for
intercollegiate athletics, with a corresponding opportunity for
other claimants such as coaches and administrators to tap into
the excess.”180
In contrast to professional sports that implement revenue
sharing, penalize excessive payrolls, limit aggregate payrolls,
and limit individual player compensation through negotiation
with a players’ union, colleges have simply agreed amongst
themselves through the NCAA to limit player remuneration to

175. See, e.g., Narcos: Mexico (Netflix 2021) (chronicling the rise of the
Guadalajara Cartel as an American DEA agent learns the danger of targeting
“Narcos” in Mexico).
176. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45–46
(1964).
177. Id. at 45–48.
178. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 196.
179. See id. (“The former removes costs relative to what their level would
be in a competitive player market, while the latter enhances broadcast
revenues compared to their competitive level.”).
180. Id. Before 1984, the NCAA limited broadcasts to just one game per
week, which created an artificial scarcity of games. See id. at 196
Bids for the rights escalated rapidly, with the three over-the-air
networks chasing just a single source of game content. After the US
Supreme Court ended the broadcast rights agreement in 1984, the
number of televised games increased rapidly, and rights fees per
game plummeted to less than a third of the level that they had been
under the plan. But fees recovered quickly, as new technologies to
record and play televised shows without advertisements increased
the relative value of advertising on broadcasts that viewers
preferred to watch live, especially sports. (citation omitted)
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a tuition scholarship, plus room and board, and now all meals
and snacks.181
To maintain a cartel, each operation must control four
challenges: (1) the difficulty in reaching agreement among
diverse constituents, (2) the erosion of profits by non-price
competition or cheating, (3) the deterrence of new entrants, and
(4) the equitable distribution of the spoils. 182 “The NCAA is no
exception.”183
1.

Reaching Agreement

The NCAA’s member institutions must agree to restrict
both player input and broadcast output. This Article focuses on
that first restriction. Controlling what to agree on is difficult
when each member has different goals, positions, and
bargaining power.184 As Sanderson and Siegfried point out,
“[w]ith such differences among members, it is remarkable the
NCAA has coalesced for over 60 years as a vibrant cartel.”185
The NCAA is successful in limiting player input and
subsisting on a grant-in-aid with a little help from the NFL and
the NBA, whose collective bargaining agreements prohibit
drafting players who are fewer than three years out of high
school for football and one year out of high school for
basketball.186 Historically, these two policies limited a young
player’s options in the United States.187 A high school basketball
player might play overseas or in the NBA’s development
league,188 but the non-price competition incentives to play
basketball for Duke University for a year can easily persuade a
seventeen-year-old to go the college basketball one-and-done

181. Id. at 196. The bylaws are not subject to the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act because no union or collective bargaining agreement was
involved. See id.
182. Id. at 198.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 199–200.
186. Id. at 196–97.
187. See id. at 197 (“These professional league policies have drastically
reduced viable paid options available to young athletes.”).
188. Id.

34

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2022)

route.189 But this option doesn’t exist for high school football
players.190 American style football is really only played in
America; the Canadian Football League is a poor alternative in
terms of training and notoriety.191 These associational and
marketplace restrictions funnel college athlete-age players into
intercollegiate play.
2.

Controlling Non-Price Competition and Controlling
Cheating

Though cartel participants agree to alter their behaviors,
participants are still often rivals, and incentives exist for a
cartel member to “advertise, improve service, innovate, or
otherwise expend funds in an effort to add unit sales at the
expense of rivals” (non-price competition).192 Failing to control
non-price competition causes all cartel members’ costs to rise
and profits to fall.193 Regarding player input, many opaque
opportunities exist for a member university to deviate from the
cartel bargain.194 These incentives—like intense recruiting,
state of the art training and playing facilities, professional grade
locker rooms and recreational players areas, luxury and health
conscious food and dining options, and selling a dream of fame
and glory on a televised, national stage—can create competition
that can undermine the original bargain.195 When there is no
salary to attract players, non-price competition can become the
selling point.196
189. See id. at 199 (“When direct price (salary) competition is prohibited,
non-price competition will increasingly affect prospective players’ choices
about which institution to attend.”). But see Bridget Condon, ‘Luckiest Man in
the Word’: LaVar Ball Has 3 Sons in the NBA and Tells ABC11 All About It,
ABC 11 (Dec. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/89Q7-3AH2 (“Ball has had sharp
words about the NCAA and used both of his younger sons as examples . . . .
Both LiAngelo Ball and LaMelo Ball played overseas and from there went to
the NBA.”).
190. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 197.
191. The Arena Football League is no longer an option, folding in October
2019. Gary Phillips, Arena Football League Closes Shop After 30-Plus Years,
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://perma.cc/X4GH-R5QZ.
192. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 199.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Cartels must protect profits from those cheating on the
bargain. Because cheating in recruiting and payments to
players, for example, can impact a cartel’s profit distributions,
cartels must provide incentives to deter cheating.197 Because
cheaters often do so secretly, the cartel must provide either an
enforcement arm or a mechanism to incentivize participants to
report on one another.198 The NCAA employs both, dolling out
the dreaded “death penalty” for its most egregious defectors.199
The “death penalty,” which requires a school to sit out of
athletics for a season, was enforced only once against SMU in
1987 for what was then, and would even now be, considered
egregious recruiting and pay-for-play violations.200 It has never
been used against a school again due to harsh backlash and
long-term impacts to college football’s reputation of purity.201

197. Id. at 200.
198. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines
Cartel Success, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 67 (2006) (“[Successful cartels]
develop an elaborate internal hierarchy that allows communication on various
levels (executive and middle-management) not only to provide flexibility in the
details of the agreement, but to build trust.”).
199. See FLEISCHER III ET AL., supra note 106, at 24 (detailing the history
of NCAA enforcement measures).
200. See NCAA COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
INFRACTIONS REPORT 2 (1987), https://perma.cc/Z5V9-3J4R (PDF) (“During the
period September 1985 through December 1986 . . . 13 football team members
received payments during the 1985–86 academic year that totaled
approximately $47,000, and eight student-athletes continued to receive
payments from September through December 1986 that totaled approximately
$14,000.”). It should be noted that NCAA infractions were—and continue to
be—widespread. See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 12, at 216 (“Violations
are so prevalent that they have become classified as secondary and major by
the NCAA. The secondary cases have become an industry within themselves.”);
Division I Infractions: 2019-20 Annual Report, NCAA (2020),
https://perma.cc/259X-THBC (PDF) (recording 3,666 Level III Violations in
2019 among NCAA member schools). The school that perhaps came closest to
receiving the “death penalty” was the University of Alabama in 2002, when it
was revealed that three boosters made payments to recruits totaling more
than $150,000. Tim Layden, The Loneliest Losers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED VAULT
(Nov. 18, 2002), https://perma.cc/EKS6-LK8W.
201. See Layden, supra note 200 (arguing that the NCAA has avoided the
“death penalty,” even when teams qualified, because the SMU “program still
hasn’t recovered”).
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3.

Deterring New Entrants

To protect its profits, cartel members must deter new
entrants who are attracted to the average 23 percent increase in
profits that results from cartel enforcement.202 The NCAA’s
Division I FBS, which generates the most revenue, successfully
maintains a vertical monopoly over cartel entrance.203
Only 14 universities have gained NCAA Division I status
since 2000. The challenge of acquiring access to one of the
five power conferences, to football bowl games, or to March
Madness are additional hurdles that face new competitors.
In October 2016 two recently successful football programs,
the University of Houston and Brigham Young University,
were both denied entry to the Big-12 conference even though
they arguably both fit its geographic profile and the Big-12
had only 10 teams at the time.204

4.

Distributing the Spoils Fairly

The final challenge for a successful cartel is to assure its
members that the fruits of its agreement are equitably
distributed.205 Those who do not contribute to the output (teams
whose games are not televised and who receive less revenues
from athletics) are likely to favor equal distribution, while those
who produce the output (teams with revenue-generating power)
are likely to favor a “distribution principle based on
production.”206 An acceptable balance can always be a challenge

202. LAWRENCE M. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS: CARTEL
BEHAVIOR VS. AMATEURISM 20 (IZN 2006), https://perma.cc/WDD2-MSSH
(PDF).
203. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 202 (“The NCAA’s Division I
FBS . . . has been quite successful in fending off potential entrants.”).
204. Id. at 203. “There are many major universities without a
commercialized intercollegiate athletics program . . . that could try to enter
the big-time, as did Michigan State successfully in the 1950s and Louisville,
Houston, and Boise State accomplished more recently.” Id. at 202. “But entry
generally is not a source of new competition for the NCAA’s elite sports
universities because the programs that have upgraded were already NCAA
members and had agreed to abide by the cartel rules. Moreover, upgrades are
hampered by other NCAA threshold requirements.” Id.
205. Id. at 203.
206. Id.
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in an unequal consumer market, otherwise a cartel member may
“bolt the agreement,”207 destabilizing the cartel.
Large revenues and media coverage have placed collegiate
athletics at the forefront of the public conversation.208
Journalists, professional athletes, members of Congress,
faculty, and the student-athletes themselves have begun to
question the revenue distribution.209 Student-athletes have
lodged protests against the payment scheme, arguing that
coaches and athletic administrators are earning “salaries that
are far in excess of what they could earn in their next-best
employment opportunities and that are at least partially earned
on the backs of players.”210 The Northwestern football team,
discussed later, attempted to unionize to bargain for
compensation and better health benefits.211 For decades, such
attempts have failed in garnering student-athletes a piece of the
pie.212
In 2018, Goldburn Maynard Jr. argued that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules, specifically those that limit endorsements,
are simply the continued enforcement of ancient sumptuary
laws, which essentially restrict luxury spending.213 Such laws
were often used to keep women, enslaved people, and low-class
persons in their socioeconomic status.214 During the Middle
Ages, sumptuary laws were enacted to limit competition from

207. Id.
208. Id. at 188 (“Gross revenues of intercollegiate athletics programs have
grown to such gargantuan proportions that an enterprise that was once largely
a peripheral activity on college campuses no longer goes unnoticed.”).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1350 (2015); see also Nicholas
Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2012)
(questioning whether existing labor laws allow college athletes to unionize).
212. See, e.g., Fram & Frampton, supra note 211, at 1027–38.
213. See Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., They’re Watching You: How the NCAA
Infringes on the Freedom of Families, 2018 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 1, 1–2 (2018)
(“[T]he NCAA’s surveillance of the family and enforcement of its rules amount
to a sumptuary restraint on the families of talented NCAA athletes.”).
214. Id. at 4.
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the up-and-coming bourgeoisie.215 According to Spanish Colonial
law:
No negra or mulata woman, free or slave, can wear gold,
pearls, or silk. But, if the free negra or mulata were married
to an español man, she may wear gold earrings with pearls,
a choker, and velvet on the hem of the skirt. They cannot
wear crepe mantles or mantles of any other fabric, except for
capes that fall just below the waist. The penalty for violating
this law will result in the removal and forfeiture of the gold
jewelry, silk dresses, and mantel.216

Well into the eighteenth century, sumptuary laws
regarding clothing were enacted for whites and enslaved people
and directed at “conceptions and images of the social order.”217
Sumptuary laws were “concerned with attempts to protect
hierarchical conceptions of social relations, to resist some of the
most directly visible manifestations of rising social groups
challenging or undermining the incumbents of advantaged
social positions.”218
As sumptuary laws are aimed at “consumption” and public
perceptions, Maynard’s logical connection to the NCAA’s current
revenue scheme reinforces many of the insidious racial and
gender impacts previously discussed.219 Their rules “exemplif[y]
a modern, ongoing attempt to enforce sumptuary laws that
disproportionately disadvantage the families of poor black
athletes.”220
Maynard discusses the cases of Reggie Bush and Ryan
Boatright, who were both penalized under the NCAA’s
amateurism rules.221 Bush was ostracized when a prospective

215. Id. at 4–5 (“The nobility figured that if bourgeois subjects appeared to
be as wealthy as themselves, it could undermine the nobility’s presentation of
themselves as powerful, legitimate rulers.”).
216. Id. at 5 (citing RECOPILACIÓN DE LAS LEYES DE LOS REINOS DE LAS
INDIAS 325 (5th ed. 1841); Danielle Terrazas Williams, Capitalizing Subjects:
Free African-Descended Women of Means in Xalapa, Veracruz During the
Long Seventeenth Century (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University)).
217. ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF
SUMPTUARY LAW 143 (1996).
218. Id.
219. See Maynard, supra note 213, at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 6–9.
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agent paid for his mother to stay in a house rent-free and for her
travel during away games.222 Upon going pro, Bush went with a
different agent, the agent sued, people found out, and Reggie
had to give back his Heisman.223 Boatright received a
three-game suspension because his mother allegedly received
travel expenses, information that the NCAA publicly released
much to the outrage of Boatright’s attorney.224 As Maynard
points out: “It is . . . impossible to escape the fact that both the
Bush and the Boatright families are black,” and that, “[n]one of
this behavior would have been suspicious if these parents were
wealthier.”225
The
NCAA
rules
disproportionately
impact
student-athletes of color. Considering the “big ticket” sports,
football and basketball, and the revenue generating (high
output) schools, the statistics are stark. A 2018 study by Dr.
Shaun Harper found that Black men made up only 2.5 percent
of undergraduate students enrolled across sixty-five studied
institutions, but they comprised 56 percent of men’s basketball
teams and 55 percent of football teams.226 The study also showed
that less than 12 percent of head coaches at these schools were
Black.227 The average salary for the sixty-five athletics directors
in the major conferences was $707,418, but just 15.2 percent of
them were Black.228 And none of the commissioners of those
conferences, who earned $2.58 million annually on average,
were Black.229
The public has considered the historical lack of spoils
distributions to the players as acceptable because, in the words
of Joe Burrow’s own father, he’s a “23-year-old millionaire living
in [his] parents’ basement.”230 But this will not be the case for
most student-athletes. Professional leagues recruit less than 2
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id. at 6–7.
224. Id. at 7–8.
225. Id.
226. HARPER, supra note 48, at 3.
227. Id. at 8.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Ryan Young, Joe Burrow Still Hasn’t Signed with Bengals, ‘Waiting
to See What Happens’ Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, YAHOO SPORTS (May 8,
2020), https://perma.cc/K884-JXT2.
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percent of athletes.231 The NCAA is “robbing them and their
families of the most valuable period of their lives,” leaving them
with only “memories of big games.”232 Otherwise, “they stay in
their socio-economic station through monitoring and threats of
lost eligibility.”233
The threat of lost eligibility and the dream that rarely
materializes also improperly incentivize student-athletes to
sacrifice their bodies and physical health, to undergo
groundbreaking surgeries on their ankles, backs, and legs, and
play injured for fear of appearing “soft” or losing their draft
stock.234 From 1960 to 1980, the average weight of an
All-American football player rose from 214.5 pounds to 226.1
pounds.235 The average college football player was 232 pounds
as of 2017, with the average University of Alabama football
player weighing in at 237.5.236 These student-athletes, and the
institutions that exploit them, leverage increased bulk and the
speed of youth against longer-term bad health impacts like head
injuries, diabetes, numerous corrective surgeries, and mental
health disorders.237
Risking this without an opportunity to share in the spoils of
their all-consuming, gladiator-like exploits, poor students of
color are transferring the revenue disproportionately to
wealthier white individuals.238 This, Maynard emphasizes, is
what makes the NCAA’s no play for pay and NIL rules even
worse than ancient sumptuary laws—the lower classes weren’t
forbidden from making money; they were just forbidden from

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics,
NCAA, https://perma.cc/GP5H-4TTH (last updated Apr. 8, 2018).
235. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 12, at 93.
236. Daniel Wilco, How Large Is the Average College Football Player?
Which Team Is the Biggest? Smallest?, NCAA (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://perma.cc/NJL9-YCGS.
237. See NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETE INSURANCE COVERAGE
OVERALL FINDINGS (2016), https://perma.cc/4H8B-9QUP (PDF).
238. See Maynard, supra note 213, at 12 (“Revenue-generating sports are
still very much built on the back of black athletes.”); HARPER, supra note 48,
at 8 (emphasizing that “white men call[] the shots” in collegiate athletics).
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dressing like nobles.239 To quote the comedic sage Chris Rock:
“Shaq is rich. The white man who signs his check is wealthy.”240
II.

AMATEURISM UNDER ANTITRUST LAW

Each generation of young persons come[s] along
and all they ask is, “Coach, give me a chance, I
can do it.” And it’s a disservice to these young
people that the management of intercollegiate
athletics stays in place committed to an
outmoded code of amateurism. And I attribute
that to, quite frankly, to the neo-plantation
mentality that exists on the campuses of our
country and in the conference offices and in the
NCAA. The coach owns the athlete’s feet, the
college owns the athlete’s body, and the athlete’s
mind is supposed to comprehend a rulebook that
I challenge Dave Berst, who’s sitting down in this
audience, to explain in rational terms to you
inside of eight hours.
Walter Byers241
Many predicted and called for the end of the NCAA’s
enforcement of amateurism, “and yet,” for years, “the NCAA
marche[d] on.”242 With the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
Alston and the pressure from states to support student-athlete
NIL commercialization, the NCAA can no longer justify its
exploitative profit distribution scheme under the guise of
amateurism.

239. See Maynard, supra note 213, at 3–4.
240. Chris Rock: Never Scared (HBO television broadcast Apr. 17, 2004).
241. Karen Given, Walter Byers: The Man Who Built the NCAA, Then
Tried to Tear It Down, WBUR (Oct. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/56HU-M7XX
(quoting Walter Byers); see also BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 12, at 2–3
(“Today, the NCAA Presidents Commission is preoccupied with tightening a
few loose bolts in a worn machine, firmly committed to the neoplantation belief
that the enormous proceeds from college games belong to the overseers (the
administrator) and the supervisors (coaches).”).
242. Maynard, supra note 213, at 12.

42

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2022)
A.

The NCAA’s Bylaws Enforcing Amateurism

The main governing document for the NCAA and its
member institutions is the 2021–2022 NCAA Division I Manual,
effective August 1, 2021.243 The Manual is a 464-page document
that includes the NCAA’s Constitution (Articles 1 to 6), the
NCAA’s Operating Bylaws (Articles 10 to 21), and an
Administrative Bylaw (Article 31).244 The Constitutional
Articles contain information regarding the NCAA’s purposes,
“its structure, its membership and legislative-process
information, and the more important principles for the conduct
of intercollegiate athletics.”245 The Operating Bylaws consist of
“legislation” adopted by the membership and regulate the
conduct of member institutions and student-athletes and their
interactions with the NCAA.246
The NCAA Constitution provides that one of the stated
purposes of the NCAA is to “encourage its members to adopt
eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of
scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism.”247 Neither the
Constitution nor the Bylaws define “amateurism.” This is likely
intentional, so that its interpretation (and enforcement) can
remain malleable on a case-by-case basis.
Of the sixteen Principles for Conduct of Intercollegiate
Athletics listed in Article 2 of the NCAA’s Constitution,248
Section 2.9 addresses the “Principle of Amateurism:”
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily
by education and by the physical, mental[,] and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in
intercollegiate
athletics
is
an
avocation,
and
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.249

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7.
Id. at x.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1.2(c).
See id. §§ 2.1–2.16.
Id. § 2.9 (emphasis added).
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I agree that student-athletes should be motivated by
education, but additional physical, mental, and social benefits
derive from intercollegiate athletic participation. Further,
previous studies250 indicate that the motivation is not always
primarily education-motivated, nor is such participation a
“hobby.”251 Rule-adjacent bylaws impacted by the Principle of
Amateurism are grounded in related principles like “competitive
equity,” “recruiting,” “eligibility,” and “financial aid.”252 Like
amateurism, many of these related principles are hortatory in
theory but unrealistic in practice.
Member institutions in Division I also support certain
“commitments” that are not binding, but should serve as
overarching guidance for regulatory rules.253 The “Commitment
to Amateurism” requires member institutions to conduct their
athletics programs in accordance with the NCAA Bylaws, “thus
maintaining a line of demarcation between student-athletes
who participate in the Collegiate Model and athletes competing
in the professional model.”254 Though the constitutional articles
do not define “amateurism,” based on this language it likely
entails some distinction between college and professional sports.
Further, the NCAA’s definition of a “professional athlete”
entails the concept of payment: “one who receives any kind of
payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation,
except as permitted.”255 Extrapolating from those two
definitions, we can surmise that amateurism at least involves a
demarcation between college and professional sports in which
payment equals professionalism.

250. See SHAUN R. HARPER, BLACK MALE STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL
INEQUITIES IN NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (2016),
https://perma.cc/P8GH-BKMH (PDF) (“Black men are socialized to value
sports over academics at a young age . . . .”).
251. Avocation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/KZB98LR6 (“[A] subordinate occupation pursued in addition to one’s vocation
especially for enjoyment: HOBBY.”).
252. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, §§ 2.10–2.13.
253. See id. at xiii (“[M]embers . . . support the following commitments in
the belief that these commitments assist in defining the nature and purposes
of the division.”).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 12.02.11.
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Of all the Operating Bylaws, I focus on Article 12, which
regulates “Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility.”256 Article 12’s
reach is expansive, regulating conduct both before full-time
enrollment (labeled an individual) and during full-time
enrollment (labeled a student-athlete).257 Article 12 provides a
list of general principles of amateurism and an extensive
definitions section that, notably, fails to define “amateurism.”
The article also regulates involvement with professional teams,
the use of agents, employment, promotional activities, financial
donations from outside organizations, athletic eligibility
requirements, the five‑year seasons of competition rule, as well
as rules governing certification, loss of, and restoration of
eligibility.258 While many of these rules deserve intense scrutiny
and potential revision, this next subsection focuses on the rules
that impinge on pay for play and NIL commercialization, as well
as some eligibility rules impacted by either pay-for-play or NIL
commercialization rules.
1.

Amateurism Certification Process

All student-athletes at a member institution must submit
to an amateur certification process, in which an institutional
center reviews a student-athlete’s activities prior to the
submission of the request.259
2.

Pay for Play

Once certified, student-athletes can lose their amateur
status (and be ineligible to compete) if, among other things,
they: use their athletic skill for pay in any form in that sport or
256. Id. art. 12.
257. See id. § 12.01.3
NCAA amateur status may be lost as a result of activities prior to
enrollment in college. If NCAA rules specify that an “individual”
may or may not participate in certain activities, this term refers to
a person prior to and after enrollment in a member institution. If
NCAA rules specify a “student-athlete,” the legislation applies only
to that person’s activities after enrollment.
258. See id. § 12.2 (Involvement with Professional Teams); id. § 12.3 (Use
of Agents); id. § 12.4 (Employment); id. § 12.5 (Promotional Activities); id.
§ 12.6 (Financial Donations from Outside Organizations); id. § 12.7 (Athletics
Eligibility Requirements); id. § 12.8 (Seasons of Competition: Five-Year Rule).
259. Id. § 12.1.1.1.
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accept a promise of pay in the future,260 receive a salary,261
“reimbursement . . . or any other form of financial assistance
from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill
or participation.”262
Section 12.02.10 defines “pay” as “the receipt of funds,
awards or benefits not permitted” by the rules.263 Prohibited
forms of pay under the rules include “[a]ny direct or indirect
salary, gratuity, or comparable compensation”;264 “[a]ny division
or split of surplus” such as from bonuses or game receipts (which
would include funds from commercial licensing of games, for
example);265 unauthorized educational expenses (although a
“grant-in-aid” is not considered pay);266 excessive or improper
expenses, awards, and benefits (here, the NCAA includes cash
or funds placed in trust as an award for participation in sports
at any time or excessive expenses from an outside sponsor above
“actual and necessary expenses”);267 and payments based on
performance (those conditioned on a player or team’s finish or
performance or preferential treatment based on skill).268
Like any overly regulated and convoluted set of rules,
exceptions exist. Many of these exceptions, however, benefit the
NCAA, the member institution, or the international governing
body over the student-athlete. For example, institutional,
charitable, educational, or fundraising activities that involve
the use of a student-athlete’s abilities, such as a “swim-a-thon”
are allowed, but all money must go to the institution or
sponsoring organization.269
Exceptions are made for student-athletes participating in
the Olympics, but all payments received must be for educational
expenses and Olympians can only receive the same

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. § 12.1.2(b).
Id. § 12.1.2.1.1.
Id. § 12.1.2(d).
Id. § 12.02.10.
Id. § 12.1.2.1.1.
Id. § 12.1.2.1.2.
Id. § 12.1.2.1.3.1.
Id. § 12.1.2.1.4.1.1.
Id. § 12.1.2.4.3.
Id. § 12.1.2.4.5.
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nonmonetary benefits available to other Olympians in that
sport.270
There is also, unsurprisingly, an exception for tennis.
Individuals who received tennis prize money before enrolling as
student-athletes may keep up to $10,000 of that prize money per
year and then may accept payment for actual and necessary
expenses on top of the $10,000 limit.271 Non-tennis players can
only receive prize money that does not exceed their individual,
or their family’s, actual and necessary expenses.272 Why tennis
you ask? The egalitarian response is that tennis is a solo sport
which is difficult to fund with the necessary coaching and
travel.273 But a more cynical response is that, well, wealthy
people play tennis and likely lobbied the Board of Governors to
make exceptions for tennis in 2012.
Without losing their eligibility, student-athletes may
receive, for instance, (1) awards valued at several hundred
dollars for athletic performance (athletic “participation
awards”), which may take the form of Visa gift cards;274 (2)
disbursements—sometimes thousands of dollars—from the
NCAA’s Student Assistance Fund (SAF) and Academic
Enhancement Fund (AEF) for a variety of purposes, such as
academic achievement or graduation awards, school supplies,
tutoring, study-abroad expenses, post-eligibility financial aid,

270. Id. §§ 12.1.2.4.5–12.1.2.4.7.
271. Id. § 12.1.2.4.2.
272. Id. § 12.02.2.1.
273. This rationale appears reasonable at first glance. After all,
“[p]rospective student-athletes and their families spend exorbitant amounts of
money for travel and other expenses related to competing in tennis events.”
Division I Proposal—2007–23–A, NCAA, https://perma.cc/HX3N-JWYF.
However, the NCAA does not make similar exceptions for other sports, which
can be expensive. “A study conducted [in 2016] by TD Ameritrade found that
parents whose children participated in ‘highly competitive or elite teams run
by a non-school organization’ were spending on average $100 to $500 per
month, per child. And at least 20 percent of them dished out $1,000 per
month.” Jason Smith, Paying to Play: How Much Do Club Sports Cost?, USA
TODAY (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/PTF3-F8S3. The study broke
down average expenses per sport, per year, finding: baseball at $3,700; softball
“just over $1,000”; basketball at $500 or $5,000 (depending on whether the
team is sponsored by a company like Nike or Adidas); soccer between $2,500
and $5,000; and volleyball either $8,000–$10,000 or $1,500 (depending on
whether the team is on a “nation-wide” or “regional” circuit). Id.
274. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 16.1.4.1.
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health and safety expenses, clothing, travel, personal or family
expenses, loss-of-value insurance policies, car repair, personal
legal services, parking tickets, and magazine subscriptions;275
(3) cash stipends of several thousands of dollars calculated to
cover costs of attendance beyond the fixed costs of tuition, room
and board, and books, but used wholly at the student-athlete’s
discretion;276 (4) unlimited meals and snacks;277 (5)
reimbursements for expenses incurred by student-athletes’
significant others and children (up to six persons once a year) to
attend certain athletic competitions;278 and (6) a $30 per diem
for “unitemized incidental expenses during travel and practice”
for championship events.279
The NCAA created many of these exceptions in the past six
years.280 “[B]efore 2015, athletic participation awards did not
take the form of cash-like Visa gift cards.”281 And after the
NCAA permitted grants-in-aid for the full cost of attendance
(COA), effective August 2015, many more student-athletes
began to receive above-COA payments, such as cash stipends,
Pell Grants, and AEF as well as SAF distributions.282

275. Id. § 15.01.6.
276. Id. §§ 15.2.4, 15.2.6–15.2.6.4.
277. Id. § 15.2.2.1.6.
278. Id. § 16.6.1.1. Note that the rules allow for reimbursement. Many
families are not in a financial position to pay for such travel expenses up front.
See Study College Athletes Worth Six Figures Live Below Federal Poverty Line,
supra note 44.
279. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 16.8.1.1.
280. See, e.g., id. § 15.2.6.3 (effective date 8/1/19); id. § 15.2.6.4 (effective
date 8/1/19); id. § 15.2.2.1.6 (effective date 8/1/14); id. § 16.6.1.1 (revised date
1/19/18); id. § 16.8.1.1 (revised date 8/7/14).
281. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d
1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 2020). However, further investigation indicates that the
Chick-fil-A Bowl distributed Visa gift cards as far back as 2013. See David
Broughton, Want a New Gift Suite Choice? Take a Seat, SPORTS BUS. J. (Dec.
9, 2013), https://perma.cc/2YUE-Z8SF; Bowl Games Gift Guide, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2014, 11:41 PM), https://perma.cc/SSV3-6B8F.
282. See Michael McCann, How Tentative Grant-in-Aid Class Action
Settlement Affects NCAA, Student-Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 4,
2017), https://perma.cc/G88A-DRZ8.
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3.

Professional Activities

The NCAA’s regulation of professional activities and
involvement with professional sports is where some of the more
particularized input rules consider professional sports
organizations and leagues. Many of the particular rules or
exceptions in this section involve either men’s hockey, baseball,
or men’s skiing; men’s hockey being subject to the NHL, which
uses a hybrid junior league model reminiscent of European
soccer clubs.283 The special rules for men’s skiing seem to be a
direct response to the Jeremy Bloom case, discussed below.284
While individuals are allowed to try out for and practice with
professional leagues, athletes can lose their amateur status, for
example, if they sign a contract with a professional team,285
enter the draft,286 hire a sports agent,287 or promise to hire a
representative for future negotiations (the Reggie Bush rule).288
However, the student-athlete can benefit from the use of a
professional sports counseling panel, provided by the
institution, which has limited counseling authority, and still
retain their amateur status.289 Hiring an agent is otherwise
strictly prohibited.290
Professional sports organizations can contribute funds to a
member institution, but such funds must not be earmarked for
athletics and must be put in the general university fund,291 or
be used in a commercial venture to promote institutional sports
other than men’s basketball and football.292
Also included under “professional activities” is working an
actual job, like a sales position. Student-athletes may do so
283. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 12.2 (exempting men’s hockey and
skiing from rules governing “involvement with professional teams”); id.
§ 12.3.1 (exempting baseball and men’s hockey from rules banning
representation by an agent).
284. See infra Part III.
285. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 12.1.2(c).
286. Id. § 12.2.4.2. The athletes lose eligibility even if they rescind their
name from the draft prior to the draft. Id. § 12.2.4.2(a).
287. Id. § 12.1.2(g).
288. Id. § 12.3.1.3.
289. Id. § 11.1.3.1.
290. Id. § 12.1.2(g).
291. Id. § 12.6.1.3.
292. Id. § 12.6.1.3(d).
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(provided they can find the time—they can’t), as long as they are
paid the market rate for their work and their NILs are not used
to promote or advertise the products or services.293 A
student-athlete can also start a business, but he or she cannot
use their NIL to advertise, promote, or sell the products or
services.294 Finally, and almost laughably, student-athletes can
essentially sell institutional merchandise to community
boosters and organizations during a “goodwill tour,” but “on a
salary,” not a commission.295
4.

Promotional Activities

Though the NCAA and its member institutions can profit
off their student-athletes’ NILs, since its inception the NCAA
has prohibited student-athletes from receiving any
remuneration for the use of their NILs and from
commercializing their NILs.296 For example, the member’s
institutional, charitable, educational, or nonprofit activities are
authorized to incorporate student-athlete NILs to support their
activities, subject to some limitations on commercial
co-ventures,297 but NCAA rules require that funds raised go
directly to the sponsoring institution or organization.298
Further, the institution and its institutionally controlled
outlets, or said charitable, educational, or nonprofit
organizations, can sell commercial items with the NILs of
multiple student-athletes, but not individual ones.299 Jerseys
with a student-athlete’s individual name on the back of it are,
technically, unauthorized.300 And of course, the NCAA has full
reign to use the NILs of any and all of the student-athletes,
collectively or individually, to promote its championships,
events, activities, or programs.301
293. Id. § 12.4.1.1.
294. Id. § 12.4.4.
295. Id. § 12.4.2.4.
296. Robert Litan, The NCAA’s “Amateurism” Rules What’s in a Name?,
MILKEN INST. REV. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/KVV5-CSLN.
297. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 12.5.1.1.
298. Id. § 12.5.1.1(e).
299. Id. § 12.5.1.1(h).
300. Id.
301. Id. § 12.5.1.1.1.
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Ironically, it is also permissible for a student-athlete’s NIL
to appear in books, articles, and other publications, films, or
videos related to sport-skill demonstration, analysis, or
instruction.302 So if I, a professor, wanted to write an academic
article critiquing the skill of a particular student-athlete and
incorporate still images of that student-athlete demonstrating
those skills, I can.
But the student-athletes would not be eligible to compete if
the individual accepted compensation for, or permitted the use
of, their NIL to advertise a commercial product or services or if
they received remuneration for use of such product or service.303
While the student-athletes were allowed to engage in media
activities, they could not receive remuneration, and they could
not miss class.304
More troubling is Section 12.5.2.2’s requirement that the
student-athlete must actively take steps to prevent third parties
and individuals from using their name and likeness in an
impermissible commercial manner.305 This onus is placed on the
student-athlete (and their institution), despite the prohibition
against the student-athlete protecting or commercializing their
name or likeness through the majority of the student-athlete’s
years of eligibility.306
Many of these rules, which the NCAA purports are meant
to protect the student-athletes from commercial exploitation,
are continuances of ancient sumptuary laws. Institutions cannot
distribute player “trading cards,” but a commercial entity can
distribute a wallet-sized program schedule card if the
302. Id. § 12.5.1.5.
303. Id.
304. Id. § 12.5.1.1(d).
305. Id. § 12.5.2.2
If a student-athlete’s name or picture appears on commercial items
(e.g., T-shirts, sweatshirts, serving trays, playing cards, posters) or
is used to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or permission, the
student-athlete (or the institution acting on behalf of the
student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an activity in
order to retain eligibility for intercollegiate athletics. Such steps are
not required in cases in which a student-athlete’s photograph is sold
by an individual or agency (e.g., private photographer, news
agency) for private use.
306. Id.
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student-athlete’s NIL is not used on the same page as the
commercial language (i.e., turn the card over).307 Further, an
individual who was an Olympic athlete prior to enrollment is
allowed to receive payment for the advertisement, but they must
“forward[] the payment to the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic
Committee or national governing body for the general use of the
organization(s).”308
If an individual worked as a model before becoming a
student-athlete, they can continue earning in that capacity at
market rate, as long as the student-athlete does not promote a
commercial product or services or let their sports abilities or
involvement be used.309 Such a rule essentially allows persons
who are already in an elevated social and economic sphere to
continue to reside in that space.
The Bylaws most akin to ancient sumptuary laws are those
that regulate the size of a commercial sponsor’s logo that can
appear on a student-athlete’s uniform, and even the size of logos
on clothing worn during post-game activities––two and
one-fourth inches,310 with a special rule for uniforms with
laundry labels.311
5.

Current NCAA Interim Policy on Name, Image, and
Likeness and State Fair Pay to Play Acts

In response to California, the NCAA published notices in
2019 encouraging each conference to consider ways to allow
student-athletes to share in the revenues and participate in the
commercialization of student-athlete NILs.312 Amidst state,
federal, and socio-cultural pressure and with several state NIL
statutes set to take effect on July 1, 2021, the NCAA issued an
Interim Policy on student-athlete name, image, and likeness
commercialization on June 30, 2021.313 Effective in all three
307. Id. § 12.5.1.1.5.
308. Id. § 12.5.1.2.
309. Id. § 12.5.1.3.
310. Id. § 12.5.4.
311. Id. § 12.5.4.1.
312. Khristopher J. Brooks, NCAA to Let College Athletes Profit from Their
Likeness, CBS (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://perma.cc/EUC6-TJY2.
313. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and
Likeness Policy, NCAA (June 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/94PQ-BFJS.
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NCAA Divisions, the policy essentially provides that
student-athletes can engage in NIL commercialization activities
according to their applicable state laws and university rules and
policies; that student-athletes in non-NIL permissible states can
retain NCAA eligibility if engaging in such commercialization;
and that student-athletes can hire agents and work with
attorneys to protect and commercialize their rights.314
Noting that the policy is a temporary solution pending
further collaboration between the NCAA and Congress, Division
Presidents explicitly provided that the policy maintains the
NCAA’s rules prohibiting pay for play, but allows NIL
commercialization.315 This crucial distinction was intended to
“reinforce[] key principles of fairness and integrity” and
“prohibit[] improper recruiting inducements.”316 Such a
statement continues to link direct payments for players’ on field
participation with maintaining “integrity” and “fairness.”317
While legislative efforts at the state level may have
prompted this movement within the NCAA, such state acts, in
their haste to protect their student-athlete constituents, both
expand and limit NIL commercialization rights. The California
Act bars an association from preventing student-athletes in
California from profiting off their NILs, as well as allows
student-athletes to hire licensed agents and attorneys.318 This
would allow student-athletes in California to negotiate with
video game companies for their NIL usage in college sports
games; to receive compensation to sponsor summer camps; and
to sign endorsement deals with apparel companies, sports
beverage companies, car dealerships, or other commercial
entities.319
The Act, however, prevents a student-athlete from entering
into a contract that conflicts with their team’s contract.320 This
limitation gives the member institution broad leeway to reject
individual endorsements that might conflict with any number of

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456(a)(3), (c)(1) (West 2022).
See id. § 67456(a)(3).
Id. § 67456(e)(1)–(3).
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their numerous commercial sponsorship deals.321 Further, the
Act provides no mechanism for student-athletes to challenge or
refute such an institutional determination.322 None of the acts
allow for pay for play.323
Such discussions have not been limited to state legislatures.
Senators Cory Booker and Richard Blumenthal authored a
Student Athlete Equity Act.324 Both senators spoke during a
Senate Judiciary Hearing on July 22, 2020, regarding the need
to protect athletes, whose “blood, sweat, and tears . . . is what
fuels a $14 billion industry.”325 Blumenthal wants to give
athletes lifetime scholarships to complete degrees.326 Senator
Booker expressed concern about the long term impacts to athlete
health.327 However, most of the testimony presented from
member institutions or the NCAA expressed a desire to have a
federal antitrust exemption that would immunize the NCAA,
calling judicial antitrust enforcement a “blunt instrument” that
exists “without considering any broader collateral effects on
intercollegiate athletics” as a whole.328
Unless and until Congress either protects student-athlete
rights or makes an explicit exception for student-athletes under
antitrust scrutiny, courts are duty-bound to analyze challenges
to the NCAA’s amateurism rules under the Sherman Act.329 The
NCAA’s activities are commercial in nature, they involve a
restraint on trade, and are subject to antitrust law’s

321. See Bank, supra note 17, at 114 (arguing that the loophole “removes
most of the potential for [California’s Act] to be a ‘game changer’”).
322. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2022).
323. The California Act, for example, does not address direct payments for
play. Id.
324. Student Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).
325. Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 26:00–26:17 (2020) (statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), https://perma.cc/5RU5VQ2G.
326. Id. at 30:40–30:47.
327. Id. at 36:00–36:15 (statement of Sen. Cory Booker, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary).
328. Id. at 50:15–50:25 (statement of Sen. Cory Booker, Member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary).
329. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2159–60 (2021) (subjecting the
NCAA’s rules to the Sherman Act).
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protection.330 While the current cases may have asked the
inappropriate question under the antitrust framework in the
context of amateurism,331 the Supreme Court and any future
legislation or associational legislation should shape its
amateurism rules with antitrust laws and ideals in mind.
B.

The Principle of Amateurism Under Antitrust Scrutiny

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
NCAA is the guardian of the “revered tradition” of amateurism
in intercollegiate athletics and has wide leeway to uphold that
tradition.332 In Board of Regents, the Court’s justification
supporting amateurism in intercollegiate athletics was that it
promotes “competitive balance.”333 The Court stated in dicta
that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering
competition among amateur athletic teams and [are] therefore
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics.”334
Enshrined in the Court’s explication of the revered tradition
of amateurism is both an assumption that the NCAA has broad
authority to enforce that principle and a presumption that its
rules in furtherance of that goal are reasonable.
Numerous plaintiffs have brought suits challenging the
NCAA’s rules governing amateurism as Sherman Act violations
since the 1970s.335 Until the past decade, such claims found little
success when either brought by a player or when challenging
330. Id.
331. See id. at 2159 (“The ‘statutory policy’ of the Act is one of competition
and it ‘precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.’”).
332. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984); see id. at 101 n.23;
Ryan S. Hilbert, Maintaining the Balance: Whether a Collegiate Athlete’s
Filing of a Federal Trademark Application Violates NCAA Bylaws, 2 BERKELEY
J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 120, 123 (2013) (“The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the National Collegiate Athletic Association (‘NCAA’) as ‘the
guardian of an important American tradition’—amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics.” (citing Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004))).
333. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 116–17.
334. Id. at 117.
335. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust
Law: Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 61, 83–86 (2013) (collecting cases).
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amateurism, eligibility, or recruiting violations, as judicial
decisions on these cases exempt the NCAA’s bylaws from
antitrust scrutiny as “noncommercial.”336 Scholars lament that
these decisions were wrongly decided under antitrust doctrine
and that the NCAA’s limitations on pay for play and NIL
commercialization are “the very antithesis to the type of
competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman
Act.”337 The Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston
attempts to right these wrongs.
1.

Sherman Act Framing

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade . . . is . . . illegal.”338 Courts balance this plain language
against a common law “reasonableness” gloss.339 To reach this
reasonableness analysis, a plaintiff must first meet two
“threshold requirements”: (1) the existence of a “concerted
action between two legally distinct economic entities” (2) that
affects “trade or commerce among the several states.”340 If a
plaintiff can meet these two threshold requirements, the court
will apply a competitive effects test to the challenged restraint
and determine whether the alleged restraint unduly suppresses
competition.341
In applying the competitive effects test, a fact finder can
apply one of three standards.
(1) On one end of the spectrum is a “per se” analysis in
which a restraint that appears nefarious on its face is deemed
per se unreasonable, unless subject to an exemption.342
(2) On the other end of the spectrum is “rule of reason” test.
If the court thinks, on first glance, that the restraint has some
competitive benefit, it will apply a rule of reason
336. Id.
337. Id. at 70.
338. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
339. See Edelman, supra note 335, at 70–71 (“[C]ourts have interpreted
the [Sherman] Act, in conjunction with preexisting common law, to prohibit
only those contracts that ‘unreasonably’ restrain trade.”).
340. Id. at 71 (citation omitted).
341. Id. at 73.
342. Id.
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between
“restraints
with
analysis—distinguishing
anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and
restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s
best interest.”343 It additionally
requires investigating every aspect of a restraint, including
[(A)] whether the parties to the restraint had the power to
control any relevant market (“market power”), [(B)] whether
the restraint encourages or suppresses competition, and [(C)]
whether the restraint caused the market place “antitrust
harm.”344

Finally, (3)
A court may elect to perform an “abbreviated or quick-look
rule of reason analysis.” Under this third test, a court will
probe into certain aspects of a restraint while relying on its
initial presumptions about others. Most courts that apply the
quick-look test do so in favor of the plaintiff based on a
preliminary finding of anticompetitive effects, relieving the
burden of establishing market power and shifting the burden
to the defendant to provide justification.345

Within this Section 1 analysis framework, however, courts
bifurcate claims involving the NCAA into those involving
“commercial” activities, like television broadcasting contracts,
and those involving “noncommercial” activities, namely bylaws
addressing and enforcing amateurism and eligibility rules, often
dismissing cases at this threshold stage as non-commercial.346
While the landmark 1984 Supreme Court case Board of Regents
of Oklahoma v. NCAA found that the actions of the NCAA and
its member institutions were subject to the Sherman Act, it did
so in the context of examining agreements meant to restrict the
number of games available for television broadcasting deals.347
But when the claimant is challenging an amateurism,
eligibility, or recruiting rule, courts routinely exempt the claims
from antitrust scrutiny as noncommercial.348 The circuit courts
343. Id. at 74 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
344. Id.
345. Id. (footnotes omitted).
346. See id. at 85.
347. Id. at 94.
348. See Edelman, supra note 335, at 83–86 (providing cases).
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that reach a competitive effects test are inconsistent in their
application, and one court misapplied the rule of reason analysis
upon reaching it.349
2.

Pre-2008 Cases

Operating under this presumptively reasonable gloss,
numerous relevant circuit and lower court decisions addressing
amateurism rules exempt the particular bylaw from antitrust
scrutiny, stating that the NCAA’s rules maintaining the balance
between amateurism and professionalism are noncommercial.
Courts would exempt the rules regarding amateurism,350
recruiting,351 or eligibility352 as non-commercial, only reaching
commerciality and conducting a rule of reason analysis
regarding coaches’ salaries.353 Edelman discusses eight
349. See id. at 83 (arguing that the circuits that exempted NCAA eligibility
rules from antitrust scrutiny based their reasoning on faulty factual
assumptions and interpretations).
350. See Coll. Athletic Placement Servs. v. NCAA, No. 74-1144, 1974 WL
998, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974) (explaining that the legal challenge to rules
presented in the case did not come within the purview of the Sherman Act
because it served merely to “preserv[e] [the] educational standards in its
member institutions”); Marjorie Webster Junior Coll., Inc. v. Middle States
Ass’n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 432 F.2d 650, 654–55 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(noting that antitrust laws were inapplicable to regional college associations
setting eligibility accreditation because no commercial motive existed); Jones
v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (stating that the plaintiff could
not challenge the NCAA’s rule banning a college hockey player for his previous
receipt of an athletic stipend and that the actions were noncommercial).
351. See Pocono Invitational Sports Camps v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569,
584 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (reasoning that NCAA Bylaw allowing Division I coaches
to evaluate high school basketball players only at certified camps did not
violate antitrust law).
352. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740–41, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(deciding that a plaintiff wishing to return to college football after entering the
NFL draft could not bring an antitrust challenge against the NCAA,
distinguishing between broadcasting restrictions (“business rules”) and
amateurism bylaws (“eligibility rules”)); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d
Cir. 1998) (deciding that a rule that barred a student from eligibility to play
for a school different from the graduate one she was currently attending was
exempted from antitrust scrutiny); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497
(D.N.J. 1998) (noting that NCAA Bylaws that determine academic eligibility
lie outside the Sherman Act).
353. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151–52 (5th Cir. 1977)
(NCAA rule limiting how many coaches an institution could hire); Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (NCAA rule capping
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pre-2008 cases in which the courts were simply wrong in finding
that amateurism rules were non-commercial.354
One case that Edelman did not discuss, which seems to have
shaped many of the NCAA’s exceptions for men’s skiing and
previously professional athletes, is Jeremy Bloom’s case. In
Bloom v. NCAA,355 the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
imposition of the NCAA’s rule that athletes cannot receive
endorsements for sports other than the one they play for their
university.356 In Bloom, an Olympic skier went on to play NCAA
football for the University of Colorado after receiving notoriety
and fame as a teenager for his skill in moguls and his Olympic
performance.357 The NCAA determined that, because of his
previous status as a professional before he entered college, he
was ineligible to play NCAA football.358
Finally, as recently as 2012, the Seventh Circuit in Agnew
v. NCAA359 affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing
student-athletes’ action against the NCAA.360 The athletes
unsuccessfully alleged that regulations capping the number of
scholarships per team and prohibiting multi-year scholarships
were anticompetitive.361
3.

And Then There Was O’Bannon

In 2015, the Ninth Circuit went rogue, upholding the
district court’s findings that the NCAA’s amateurism rules
were, in fact, subject to antitrust laws and that the challenged
conduct constituted an unlawful restraint of trade.362
In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball
player at UCLA, visited a friend whose son told O’Bannon that

compensation of entry-level coaches). But see Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426,
430–438 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting an antitrust challenge arising from the
NCAA banning a coach from coaching).
354. See Edelman, supra note 335, at 83–86.
355. 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004).
356. Id. at 627.
357. Id. at 622.
358. Id.
359. 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
360. Id. at 347.
361. Id.
362. See generally O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Electronic Arts (EA), a software company that produced video
games, was using O’Bannon’s NIL in a college basketball video
game.363 The video game avatar visually resembled O’Bannon,
played for UCLA, and wore O’Bannon’s jersey number: 31.364
O’Bannon did not consent to this use nor was he compensated
for it.365 In 2009, O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate
Licensing Company (CLC) complaining that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules, which prevented student-athletes from
receiving compensation for their NILs, was an illegal restraint
of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.366
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court and
other circuits that “many of the NCAA’s amateurism rules are
likely to be procompetitive,” but held that such rules are “not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny; rather, they must be analyzed
under the rule of reason.”367 Applying the rule of reason, the
circuit court found that the district court properly identified one
less restrictive alternative: allowing NCAA members to provide
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, but that the
district court’s other remedy—allowing cash compensation up to
$5,000 per year to be placed in trust— was erroneous.368 The
court affirmed and reversed in part.369
In addressing the NCAA’s threshold claim, the Ninth
Circuit flatly rejected that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s
dicta in Board of Regents that the NCAA’s amateurism rules

363. Id. at 1055.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. Synchronously, Sam Keller, a former starting quarterback for the
Arizona State University and University of Nebraska football teams, also
brought suit against the NCAA, CLC, and EA, alleging that EA had
impermissibly used student-athletes’ NILs in its video games, blaming the
NCAA and CLC for turning a blind eye. Id. Keller also stated claims under
Indiana’s and California’s right of publicity statutes and other common law
claims. Id. The two cases were consolidated and the district court granted class
certification. Id. Once certified, the plaintiffs dismissed their damages claim
with prejudice, also settling their claims against EA and CLC, and the cases
were de-consolidated. Id. at 1056. The antitrust claims left in O’Bannon went
to trial. Id.
367. Id. at 1051.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1052.
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were noncommercial and presumptively reasonable.370 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the Board of Regents case “certainly
discussed the NCAA’s amateurism rules at great length,” but it
did so “with a different and particular purpose: to explain why
NCAA rules should be analyzed under the rule of reason, rather
than held to be illegal per se.”371 The point was
significant—“Naked horizontal agreements among competitors
to fix the price of a good or service, or to restrict their output,
are usually condemned as per se unlawful.”372 According to the
circuit court, Board of Regents decided that because college
sports could not exist without certain horizontal agreements,
the NCAA’s rules should not be held per se unlawful even when,
as with Board of Regents’ television broadcasting limits, they
appear to be “pure restraints on the ability of member
institutions to compete in terms of price and output.”373 The
court’s
“encomium
to
amateurism,
though
impressive-sounding,” was just dicta.374
The district court meticulously described the impact on
trade or commerce in two relevant markets: the college
education market and the group NIL licensing market.375 In the
college education market, FBS football and Division I basketball
schools compete to recruit the best high school players by
offering them “unique bundles of goods and services” that
include non-price incentives, such as coaching, athletic facilities,
and high-quality competition.376
[V]ery few elite athletes talented enough to play FBS football
or Division I basketball opt not to attend an FBS/Division I
school; hardly any choose to attend an FCS, Division II, or
Division III school or to compete in minor or foreign

370. Id. at 1063.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984)).
374. Id.
375. O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
376. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting O’Bannon
I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 956–66).
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professional sports leagues, and athletes are not allowed to
join either the NFL or NBA directly from high school.377

Within the group NIL licensing market, the court analyzed
how, but for the NCAA’s rules, college football and basketball
athletes would be able to sell group licenses for the use of their
NILs such as for live game telecast, sports video games, game
rebroadcasts, and ads.378
Having found that the NCAA’s NIL rules impacted
competition in these two relevant markets, the court then moved
to a rule of reason analysis. At the first step, “the court found
that the NCAA’s rules have an anticompetitive effect on the
college education market.”379 Without them, schools would
compete with each other by offering recruits an amount far
exceeding the “cost of attendance.”380 The rules prohibiting
compensation for NILs is thus a price-fixing agreement: the
players pay for the services provided by the colleges with their
labor and NILs, but the sellers of these services, the colleges,
“agree to value [NILs] at zero.”381 The Ninth Circuit points out
that under this theory, the colleges and universities behave as a
cartel—colluding to fix the price of their product.382
Alternatively, the court found that the college education
market can be construed as one in which the athletes are the
sellers and the schools are the purchasers of athletic services.383
Under this perspective, the college education market is then a
monopsony: a market in which there is only one buyer (for
reasons previously discussed) for particular goods or services
(the labor and NIL rights of college-age athletes), and “the
colleges’ agreement not to pay anything to purchase recruits’
NILs causes harm to competition.”384
Surprisingly, the district court found no anticompetitive
effects with respect to the group licensing market. While these
submarkets exist, the court explained, there would be no
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. (citing O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 966).
Id. at 1057 (citing O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968–71).
Id.
Id.
O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1058.
Id. (citing O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 973, 991).
Id.
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competition within these submarkets if the NCAA rules were
changed with respect to group licensing.385 I follow the district
court’s reasoning that an NIL license’s value to a live game
broadcaster or a video game company would depend on the
licensee acquiring every license from every other team or player
it might show on screen.386 And in the video game submarket, a
creator would need to acquire the NIL rights of all teams and
players it included in the game, thus creating an economic
disadvantage to the teams and players.387 However, in what in
my opinion was clear error, the district court found that it was
“highly unlikely that groups of student-athletes would compete
with each other to sell their NIL rights; on the contrary, they
would have an incentive to cooperate to make sure that the
package of NIL rights sold to buyers was as complete as
possible.”388 Admittedly, removing the regulations might cause
an anti-competitive effect—it might create a collectively
beneficial contract that might devalue the shares of prominently
featured elite athletes. But that effect does not negate the fact
that the current regulation is anticompetitive too. Regardless, I
digress . . . sort of.389
Finding anti-competitive effects for the college education
market, the burden then shifted to the defendants to proffer
procompetitive purposes for its anti-competitive rules. At the
district court level, the NCAA offered four procompetitive
purposes: (1) Amateurism; (2) Competitive Balance; (3)
Integrating Academics and Athletics; and (4) Increasing
Output.390 The district court rejected the second and fourth
justifications, but analyzed the first and third.391
Finding that the NCAA presented two procompetitive
justifications for its limits on compensationincreasing
consumer demand for college sports and preventing a “wedge”
between student-athletes and other studentsthe district court

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 998–99 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
See infra Part IV.
O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Id.
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then proceeded to the third and final step of the rule of reason.392
The court considered whether “substantially less restrictive”
means of achieving those purposes exist other than a total ban
on compensating student-athletes for use of their NILs.393 The
court then held that the plaintiffs identified two legitimate, less
restrictive alternatives:
(1) allowing schools to award stipends to student-athletes up
to the full cost of attendance, thereby making up for any
“shortfall” in their grants-in-aid, and (2) permitting schools
to hold a portion of their licensing revenues in trust, to be
distributed to student-athletes in equal shares after they
leave college. The court determined that neither of these
alternatives to the total ban on NIL compensation would
undermine the NCAA’s procompetitive purposes. The court
also held that it would be permissible for the NCAA to
prohibit schools from funding these stipends or trusts with
anything other than revenue derived from the use of players’
NILs.
After entering judgment for the plaintiffs on their antitrust
claims, the district court permanently enjoined the NCAA
from prohibiting its member schools from (1) compensating
FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players for the
use of their NILs by awarding them grants-in-aid up to the
full cost of attendance at their respective schools, or (2)
paying up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation to
FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players for the
use of their NILs, through trust funds distributable after
they leave school. 394

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules are subject to antitrust scrutiny and upheld
the district court’s decision allowing NCAA member schools to
award grants in aid up to their full cost of attendance as a
substantially less restrictive alternative.395 But the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court’s $5,000 trust alternative.396
To quote the Ninth Circuit: “[I]n finding that paying students
cash compensation would promote amateurism as effectively as
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 980–81, 1003–05.
Id. at 1004–05.
O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1074–76.
Id. at 1076–79.
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not paying them, the district court ignored that not paying
student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”397 The
Ninth Circuit’s statement on the status of the $5,000 trust
payment as deferred compensation for the use of the
student-athletes’ NIL also tied NIL commercialization and
payments to features that would violate its definition of
amateurism. In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion: “The difference
between
offering
student-athletes
education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to
educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap.”398
The Ninth Circuit also critiqued the district court’s
weighing of the evidence to find that “small payments of cash
compensation will preserve amateurism.”399 The evidence
elicited, however, “merely indicate[d] that paying students large
compensation payments would harm consumer demand more
than smaller payments would—not that small cash payments
will preserve amateurism.”400 In other words, the claimants
should have put on evidence showing whether making small
payments to student-athletes serves the same procompetitive
purposes as not paying them. Without a clear definition of
“amateurism,” however, finding the proper supporting evidence
regarding how a change in that status would impact consumer
demand might prove to be a difficult task.
C.

A Shifting Tide: Alston/In re NCAA Antitrust Litigation

In March 2014, in the midst of O’Bannon I, numerous FBS
football and D1 men’s and women’s basketball players filed
multiple antitrust actions against the NCAA and eleven D1
conferences.401 These cases were later transferred to and, with
one exception, consolidated in In re Antitrust Litigation vs.
NCAA (Alston) before the same federal district court that heard
O’Bannon I.402 Unlike in O’Bannon I, the plaintiffs in Alston did
not “confin[e] their challenge to rules prohibiting NIL
397. Id. at 1076.
398. Id. at 1078.
399. Id. at 1077.
400. Id.
401. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d
1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2020).
402. Id.
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compensation,” but instead “sought to dismantle the NCAA’s
entire compensation framework,” challenging the NCAA’s
prohibitions on pay for play and NIL commercialization.403
In August 2014, the NCAA amended its D1 bylaws to allow
the Power Five conferences the autonomy to collectively adopt
“legislation” regarding limits on athletics scholarships, also
known as grants-in-aid.404 In January 2015, the Power Five
conferences voted to increase the grant-in-aid limit to the full
cost of attendance at each school.405 Subsequently, since August
2015, the NCAA Bylaws provide that a full grant-in-aid includes
“tuition and fees, room and board, books and other expenses
related to attendance at the institution up to the cost of
attendance.”406
After a ten-day bench trial, the district court entered
judgment for the student-athletes, in part.407 The district court
held that NCAA limits on education-related benefits are
“unreasonable restraints of trade,” but declined to hold that
limits unrelated to education (such as for NIL commercialization
or royalties for broadcast deals) also violate the Sherman Act.408
On May 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, relying on its holding in O’Bannon II to provide that
the NCAA’s limits on aid related to education violate antitrust
laws, but that compensation unrelated to education do not.409
Again, the Ninth Circuit stated that NIL payments were merely
a form of deferred compensation and that not paying players is
“precisely what makes them amateurs.”410
Insatiably, the NCAA filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court, which the Court granted on December 17,
403. Id.
404. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I Moves Closer to New Structure,
NCAA (July 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/9GBK-AAF4.
405. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance
Scholarships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/3NQ2-G6Y6.
406. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, § 15.02.6 (effective 8/1/15). “In
December 2015, the district court certified three injunctive relief classes
comprised of (i) FBS football players, (ii) D1 men’s basketball players, and (iii)
D1 women’s basketball players.” In re NCAA, 958 F.3d at 1247.
407. In re NCAA, 958 F.3d at 1248.
408. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp.
3d 1058, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
409. In re NCAA, 958 F.3d at 1254–55.
410. Id. at 1247 (quoting O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015)).
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2020.411 On appeal, the NCAA asked the Supreme Court to find
that its current restraints regarding amateurism survive
antitrust scrutiny, even ones related to education.412 The
student-athletes no longer sought to dismantle all of the NCAA’s
current amateurism rules (likely in light of the concurrent
passage of state NIL legislation), but instead asked the Court to
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision with respect to
education-related expenses.413 Because the student-athletes
dismissed the NIL commercialization-related claims, the Court
was left to consider only the Ninth Circuit’s decision with
respect to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism and limiting
education-related expenses.414
The Court heard oral arguments in the case on March 31,
2021, and issued its unanimous opinion on June 21, 2021.415 The
opinion provided a robust historical overview of the regulation
of intercollegiate athletics,416 highlighting the NCAA and its
member institutions’ current monopoly control over the college
athlete market (and its commercialization) under the current
rules.417 The Court also noted the vast revenues that these
institutions enjoy by profiting off the labor and likenesses of
student-athletes.418
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Court’s
opinion addressed and clarified three key legal doctrines.
1. The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules Are Subject to Antitrust’s
Rule of Reason Analysis and Not Immune as Non-Commercial
Activity
The NCAA did not dispute that it and its members enjoy
monopoly power over the market for student-athletes or that its

411. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 1.
412. Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021)
(No. 20-512), 2021 WL 408325.
413. Brief for Respondents at 1–4, Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (Nos.
20-512, 20-520), 2021 WL 859705.
414. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154–55.
415. Id. at 2144.
416. Id. at 2148–51.
417. See id.; id. at 2166 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
418. Id. at 2148–51.
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restraints do, in fact, harm competition.419 The NCAA did argue
that the lower courts used the incorrect antitrust framework,
the “rule of reason,” when reviewing the NCAA’s limits on
student-athlete compensation.420 Instead, the NCAA contended,
the lower courts should have used the deferential “quick look”
analysis.421 The Court acknowledged that reviewing restraints
on trade can require varying degrees of “work” and that the
Court can determine some restraints on trade at the far ends of
the spectrum in the “twinkling of an eye.”422 But, for the
“restraints in the great in-between,” deferential review is
inappropriate.423
Even within the context of restraints on trade in college
sports, varying degrees of antitrust review might apply. A “quick
look” might be sufficient to review and approve rules “necessary
to produce a game,” like how many players may be on the field;
other restraints may require a “fuller review.”424 In addressing
where the NCAA’s compensation rules fall, the Court was
unequivocal: “whether and to what extent those restrictions in
the NCAA’s labor market yield benefits in its consumer market
that can be attained using substantially less restrictive means”
is a “complex” question, requiring more than a “blink to
answer.”425
Attempting to rely on the commercial vs. non-commercial
distinction that appears in lower-court NCAA restriction cases
from the 1990s, the NCAA simply argued that it was immune
from antitrust scrutiny because its restrictions regarding
amateurism and eligibility are non-commercial.426 However, the
NCAA’s status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit and its purpose of
engaging in a charitable or social mission do not exempt it from
scrutiny. These attributes have not protected similarly situated
organizations that serve some social good from scrutiny under

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 2154.
Id. at 2155.
Id.
Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 2157.
Id.
Id. at 2158.
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antitrust laws.427 The Court refused to recognize an exemption
for the NCAA simply because its operations fall at the
intersection of “higher education, sports, and money.”428 Any
exemptions from application of the Sherman Act, the Court
added, are properly left to the legislature.429
2.

The Court Is Not Bound by Board of Regents’ Dicta

Despite the NCAA’s implorations, the Court clarified that it
was not bound by its oft-quoted statement in Board of
Regents.430 The holding in Board of Regents concerned the
NCAA’s restrictions on television marketing and did not require
an investigation into an amateurism rule.431 Further, the
Court’s dicta in Board of Regents merely suggested that courts
should take a more scrupulous look at student-athlete
compensation rules and remain “sensitive to their
procompetitive possibilities.”432 But the Board of Regents
decision did not hold that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions
were procompetitive and survived antitrust scrutiny.433
3.

The Lower Courts Did Not Err in Weighing the Sufficiency
of Evidence

Brushing aside the NCAA’s initial doctrinal objections, the
remainder of the Court’s opinion in Alston reviewed the lower
courts’ application of the rule of reason for error, finding none.
The Court found that the student-athletes met their initial
burden to show that the NCAA’s rules on compensation restrain

427. See id. at 2159 (“This Court has regularly refused materially identical
requests from litigants seeking special dispensation from the Sherman Act on
the ground that their restraints of trade serve uniquely important social
objectives beyond enhancing competition.”).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 2160.
430. Id. at 2157.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 2158.
433. See id. (“Board of Regents may suggest that courts should take care
when assessing the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation,
sensitive to their procompetitive possibilities. But these remarks do not
suggest that courts must reflexively reject all challenges to the NCAA’s
compensation restrictions.”).
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competition.434 To conduct this analysis, the Court explained,
requires a “fact-specific assessment of market power and market
structure” to assess the restraints’ actual impact on
competition.435
First, the Court recognized that the NCAA has “near
complete dominance of, and exercise[s] monopsony power in, the
relevant market,” which the court defined as the market for
athletic services in the plaintiffs’ relevant markets (here,
Division I basketball and FBS football).436 On this point, the
district court determined that the NCAA and its member schools
have the “power to restrain student-athlete compensation in any
way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of
diminishing their market dominance.”437 Almost by admission,
the NCAA did not contest the evidence showing that “it and its
members have agreed to compensation limits on
student-athletes . . . and these limits ‘affect interstate
commerce.’”438 During oral arguments before the Court, the
NCAA admitted that “the no-pay-for-play rule imposes a
significant restraint on a relevant antitrust market.”439 Based
on the “voluminous record” before the trial court, the plaintiffs
met their evidentiary burden to show that the NCAA’s limits on
education-related expenses restrain competition.440
Next, meeting this initial threshold, the burden shifted to
the NCAA to show a procompetitive justification for the
restriction.441 The NCAA provided three: its restraints “increase
output in college sports,” “maintain a competitive balance
among teams,” and “preserve amateurism.”442 The district court
rejected the first two justifications, which the NCAA did not

434. Id. at 2161.
435. Id. at 2155 (citation omitted).
436. Id. at 2151 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
437. Id. (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
438. Id. (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
439. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141
(2021) (Nos. 20-512, 20-520).
440. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161 (2021).
441. Id. at 2152.
442. Id.
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appeal to the Supreme Court.443 With respect to its
procompetitive justification that its rules preserve amateurism,
the NCAA argued that preserving amateurism “in turn widens
consumer choice by providing a unique product—amateur
college sports as distinct from professional sports.”444 The
district court then considered the procompetitive benefits of
amateurism in the consumer market.445
It is at this stage that the Supreme Court notes, and I think
its language could have been more explicit in doing so, that the
asserted procompetitive benefit “accrues to consumers in the
NCAA’s seller-side consumer market” and not the previously
identified restrained market of “student-athletes whose
compensation the NCAA fixes in its buyer-side labor market.”446
The district court instead considered consumer market impact,
not labor market impact.447 This comment in the Court’s opinion
leads one to consider that previous studies used in antitrust
litigation, which ask whether consumers would still watch
college sports if the student-athletes were paid or allowed to
engage in NIL commercialization, are answering the wrong
question, an implication I will discuss in more depth below.
Accepting the NCAA’s procompetitive justification that
amateurism expands consumer choice by offering a product
“distinct from professional sports,” the lower court did not err in
finding that the NCAA’s evidence was unpersuasive.448 The
NCAA first failed to define or offer a meaningful definition of
the term “amateurism,” other than an extrapolated requirement
that it be distinct from the pros.449 This lack of a clear (and
consistent) definition and application of “amateurism,” received
specific admonishment in Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring
opinion.450
443. Id. at 2151 (citing In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
444. Id. at 2152.
445. Id. (citing In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 2152–53.
449. Id. at 2152.
450. See id. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The NCAA couches its
arguments for not paying student athletes in innocuous labels. But the labels

ASSESSING AMATEURISM IN COLLEGE SPORTS

71

In weighing the evidence, the trier of fact determined that
the NCAA failed “to establish that the challenged compensation
rules . . . have any direct connection to consumer demand.”451
The NCAA’s only economic expert “on the issue of consumer
demand” failed to include “any standard measures of consumer
demand” and simply “interviewed people connected with the
NCAA and its schools, who were chosen for him by defense
counsel.”452 Comparatively, the student-athletes submitted
expert testimony and economic and other evidence showing that
(1) consumer demand has increased in recent years despite the
new types of compensation allowed, and that (2) further
increases in student-athlete compensation would “not
negatively affect consumer demand.”453
Finding no compelling evidence that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules promote competition, the lower court then
conceded that some of the NCAA’s restrictions on player
compensation might have procompetitive effects, such as limits
on payments unrelated to education.454 The burden then shifted
back to the student-athletes to demonstrate a less-restrictive
alternative to promote the same procompetitive effect, which
they easily met, considering the lack of evidence the NCAA
submitted during the second step. The NCAA’s evidence was
especially thin on the question of whether restrictions on
expenses related to education would impact competition in the
consumer market and, if so, which expenses (i.e., would giving
student-athletes assistance for all expenses related to
education, such as a trumpet for music class or a laptop for
management classes, cause consumers to consume less college
sports).455 In finding no error in the lower court’s application of
the rule of reason’s three-step analytical framework, the
Supreme Court affirmed.456

cannot disguise the reality: The NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal
in almost any other industry in America.”).
451. Id. at 2152 (majority opinion).
452. Id. at 2152–53 (internal quotations omitted).
453. Id. at 2153 (internal quotations omitted).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 2162, 2166.
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4.

Unanswered Questions and Future Doctrinal Implications

Considering the evidence and arguments presented in the
case and considering the socio-political climate on the
student-athlete NIL issue, the holdings set forth in the Supreme
Court’s June 2021 decision are not that shocking. Like with
many writs it grants, the Court took the opportunity to clarify a
longstanding misapplication and differential application of law
among district and circuit courts and to discuss the scope of its
previous decision in Board of Regents and how that case impacts
future amateurism decisions.
But we can glean multiple potential long-term implications
from the opinion. Here, I discuss three.
First, the opinion recognized the NCAA and its member
schools as engaging in cartel behavior, both with respect to the
output market and with respect to the input market, clarifying
that both are appropriate questions in an antitrust analysis.457
Again, while some cartel activity and agreements are necessary
or justifiable under antitrust scrutiny, its application to the
NCAA’s activities at multiple levels of engagement in the
marketplace should prompt the organization to reassess its
regulations, at least with respect to these two market
interfaces—the consumer market and the labor market.
Second, the Court did not consider, nor was the issue before
it, the distinct question of whether the NCAA’s NIL
commercialization rules violate antitrust principles. The
opinion “does not stop the NCAA from continuing to prohibit
compensation from sneaker companies, auto dealerships,
boosters, or anyone else.”458 To some, the NIL issue might seem
like a moot point because the NCAA no longer prohibits NIL
commercialization.459 But it’s not. We still have no working
definition of “amateurism,” and it’s unclear whether NIL
commercialization is a feature that would be included within
that definition for procompetitive purposes. The statutes are so
new, some are hastily drafted and leave room for potential
abuse, and we still do not know the implications of allowing NIL
commercialization on the market. But we can soon begin

457.
458.
459.

See id. at 1248–51.
Id. at 2164 (internal quotations omitted).
See NCAA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 22, at 3.

ASSESSING AMATEURISM IN COLLEGE SPORTS

73

collecting evidence on this issue to continue to improve these
regulations and, when necessary, protect consumers and players
while promoting competition.
Third, the opinion also shows us, or tries to show us, that
we should additionally consider and collect evidence of the
impact of the restrictions on the labor market side, as well as
evidence on the consumer-side market.460 This implication is
echoed by Kavanaugh’s concurrence, which chides the NCAA for
“generat[ing] billions of dollars in revenues for . . . . [c]ollege
presidents,
athletic
directors,
coaches,
conference
commissioners, and NCAA executives” while the “student
athletes who generate the revenues, many of whom are African
American and from lower-income backgrounds, end up with
little or nothing.”461 Though included in a concurrence and not
legally binding, this empathetic positioning, coupled with the
opinion’s suggestion to include studies focusing on player
impact, could have longer term impacts on the scope and
purposes of antitrust laws.
Should we consider impacts other than market impact
when addressing antitrust claims under the Sherman Act,
especially given that we’re dealing with college-age students
(many of whom are underage when starting college, and let’s not
forget the fourteen-year-old who was recruited and signed with
LSU back in 2014)?462 Again, in describing the restrictions on
the student-athletes, the Court used empathetic language and
said more than once that an impact study on the player market
would be appropriate.463 Such a potential move might slowly
contribute to the expanding application of antitrust laws to
include multi-faceted considerations beyond economic ones.
Importantly, the opinion did not define or provide a
definition of “amateurism,” which would be required to properly
conduct a consumer demand and labor market impact study.
The opinion only discusses particular uses of “amateurism” in
the past, such as a product “distinct from professional sports.”464
While the concurring opinion laments the NCAA’s failure to
460. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2152–53 (2021).
461. Id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
462. See Kayle Fields, 14-Year-Old Texas Junior High Quarterback
Commits to LSU, ABC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/K8VA-35FS.
463. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152–53.
464. Id. at 2152.
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adequately define and maintain any coherent method or
working definition of amateurism,465 the Court itself did not
attempt to do so. Nor was the question before it.
What the Court did show was the continued romanticizing
of college football that its dicta in Board of Regents seemed to
recognize: that college sports are revered in the United States.466
Justice Kavanaugh in Alston recognized that, yes, the “NCAA
and its member colleges maintain important traditions that
have become part of the fabric of America,”467 listing our
cherished college sporting events—“game days in Tuscaloosa
and South Bend; the packed gyms in Storrs and Durham; the
women’s and men’s lacrosse championships on Memorial Day
weekend; track and field meets in Eugene; the spring softball
and baseball World Series in Oklahoma City and Omaha; the
list goes on.”468 But as the Court points out, that does not mean
college athletics are immune from antitrust laws.469
III. ASSESSING AMATEURISM
Baseball is more than a game. It’s like life played
out on a field.
Juliana Hatfield470
With the need for a clear definition of amateurism
crystalizing within both social and legal spheres, the need to
fully understand our love of college sports—and more
specifically, what is driving it—is paramount. With the rising
passage of state NIL legislation and with news of endorsement
deals among prominent student-athletes breaking every day, we
need to address some of the unanswered, but necessary,
questions regarding college sports regulation. Namely, without

465. Id. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
466. See id. at 2148–50 (majority opinion) (regaling readers with a
140-year history of college football); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984) (“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports.”).
467. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
468. Id. at 2168–69.
469. See id. at 2155–57 (majority opinion).
470. KAREN WEEKES, “WOMEN KNOW EVERYTHING!”: 3,241 QUIPS, QUOTES,
& BRILLIANT REMARKS 406 (2007).
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a working definition of “amateurism” and an assessment of the
aspects that consumers value, it becomes impossible to study
how a change in those different features might impact consumer
demand under a strict antitrust framework. This Part attempts
to craft such a definition through theoretical, case study, and
some empirical support, to then address which aspects of
“amateurism” consumers value such that altering them would
impact consumer demand. This Part then extrapolates a core
definition of “amateurism” by investigating questions or
statements oft used in tandem or near discussions of
amateurism:
1. Is amateurism a “revered tradition” in U.S. college
sports?471
2. If so, does that mean that the product’s link to “an
academic tradition” that differentiates college sports and
makes college football, for example, more popular than
professional sports dictates that “athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like”?472
3. Do the current amateurism rules “foster[] competition”473
and “promote competitive balance,”474 and are they therefore
“procompetitive because they enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics”? 475

Finding some consumer value in college sports, this Part
ultimately theorizes that the features of “amateurism” that
consumers of college sports value are student-athlete status,
enrollment at the college (college sports and its attendant state
and regional alliances), and limitations on age and eligibility
consistent with current NCAA rules (i.e., college-age students
who haven’t played professionally in other sports). This Part
argues that not paying student-athletes and prohibiting NIL
commercialization are likely inanimate factors.

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 117.
O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
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A.

“Amateurism” Is a Revered Tradition in U.S. College
Sports
1.

It’s Certainly Unique

One thing is clear: The U.S. college sports model is
decidedly unique, if not also revered. Most of the international
sports models use a tiered club system.476 Somewhat comparable
to minor league baseball teams, the European model is like if
the Atlanta Braves had T-ball, Little League, 14U, 16U, and
18U teams, as well as various Braves teams in which adults
could play recreationally.477 England has high school teams, but
these are not as popular as club competition.478 Most European
countries simply do not have “high school” teams.479 European
soccer leagues also do not use a “draft.”480 The Australian
Football League is a “hybrid” system that uses a club system
like European soccer481 but utilizes a draft.482
The closest model to resemble the American high
school-to-college-to-the-pros system is Japan’s baseball model.
In Japan, the Nippon League (akin to our MLB) is considered
second only to the MLB in terms of premier baseball leagues.483
Nippon League also uses a draft.484 In 2018, the Japanese
government established the Japan Association for University
Athletics and Sports (UNIVAS), touting it as the country’s

476. See Stefanie Loh, Club Sports Is King in Europe, but There Are
Downsides to That System Too, PENN LIVE (Apr. 24, 2011, 2:54 PM),
https://perma.cc/79SM-P3Q8 (last updated Jan. 6, 2019, 12:09 AM).
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Andrew Miller, In Europe, You Don’t Play High School or College
Sports. Some Think U.S. Should Follow Suit., POST & COURIER (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/S75H-AQ6Y (last updated Dec. 14, 2020).
480. Does Soccer Have a Draft?, AUTH. SOCCER, https://perma.cc/4C26GCQY.
481. Youth Football, PLAY.AFL, https://perma.cc/2TNZ-Z843.
482. NAB AFL Draft History, PLAY.AFL, https://perma.cc/N8DZ-LPHY.
483. Zachary D. Rymer, How Good Is the Japanese Professional Baseball
League?, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/KC83-TYMP.
484. Kozo Ota, 2010 NPB Draft Preview: How Does the NPB Draft Work?,
TOKYO SWALLOWS (Oct. 22, 2010), https://perma.cc/6FVF-DNDC.
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version of the NCAA.485 UNIVAS includes over 200 colleges, and
Dome Corporation, Japan’s official licensee of Under Armour, is
driving its creation and funding.486 Japan is looking at the
NCAA as a revenue generating model.487
Baseball is very popular in Japan. The country’s biggest
sporting event of the year, played since 1915, is a televised high
school baseball tournament among forty-nine regional
champions played every August in front of crowds as large as
50,000 people at the Koshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, near
Kobe Mountain.488 Japanese high school coaches understand the
value of dual academic and athletic instruction: “High school
baseball is an education of the heart, the ground is a classroom
of purity, a gymnasium of morality; that is its essential
meaning.”489
2.

It’s Also a Little Socialist and Anti-Free Market.

Although our college amateurism model is certainly unique,
it is also criticized as “un-American” and a bit anti-free market.
Even the U.S. professional leagues have elements of socialism,
while European soccer leagues are more free market based.490
For example, Euro-leagues have no salary cap.491 Lionel Messi,
Cristiano Ronaldo, and Neymar each earn over $100 million
annually.492 There is also no overall spending cap: “[y]ou ‘buy’
players in Europe; you do not trade them. Those clubs that
485. J. Brady McCollough, Effort to Americanize and Monetize College
Sports in Japan Faces Obstacles, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020, 5:04 PM),
https://perma.cc/Z2C7-A2XB.
486. Id.
487. Revenue would come, largely, through university-branded apparel.
Id. UNIVAS founder, Kensuke Nakata, noticed that university-branded
clothing is very popular in the United States, but “[i]n Japan, it’s like people
feel it’s embarrassing to wear a school’s name on your T-shirt.” Id.
488. Robert Whiting, Agony and Ecstasy: Why Japan Is Obsessed with
High School Baseball, NIKKEI ASIA (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/YJW6WGRC.
489. Id. (“The fact that a man has appeared at Koshien means he will be
honored for life—and in many cases allowed admission to prestigious
universities even if not academically qualified.”).
490. See Tom McTague, America’s Wildly Successful Socialist Experiment,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/HVW7-PEAS.
491. Id.
492. Id.
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spend too much go bankrupt.”493 In contrast, failure in the
United States is “rewarded” with a draft, “a form of
redistribution rejected elsewhere in the American economy.”494
According to an article in the Atlantic by Tom McTague, “If
American and European sports leagues were politicians, Europe
would be Donald Trump, and the U.S. would be Bernie
Sanders.”495
3.

But Is It So Revered?

While our amateurism rules are unique and historical, and
while the NCAA frames its conception of a “Principle of
Amateurism” as a core article in its constitution, many question
whether amateurism in college sports is, in reality, such sacred
ground. In O’Bannon I, the NCAA argued that amateurism is
“one of the NCAA’s core principles since its founding” and that
it is “a key driver of college sports’ popularity with consumers
and fans.”496 The district court, however, found that the NCAA’s
definition of “amateurism” was “malleable” because its key
features change in “significant and contradictory ways,” citing
exceptions made to the rules, as well as the extensive use of
waivers on a case-by-case basis.497
In an attempt to chastise the NCAA, others have argued
that the NCAA “has forfeited the legitimate pursuit of
amateurism
for
the
revenues
associated
with
commercialism.”498 The connection between academics and
athletics differentiates college from professional sports.499
However,
with the increased commercialization of the NCAA, the
question is whether this educational mission has taken a
back seat to commercial goals. For example, the NCAA has a

493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing O’Bannon I,
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
497. Id. (quoting O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999–1000 (N.D. Cal.
2014)).
498. Sundram, supra note 62, at 566.
499. See id. (“This academic mission differentiated the NCAA from
professional sports.”).
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multibillion-dollar TV deal to broadcast its annual college
basketball tournament, yet out of the four semifinalists in
the 2008 tournament, only one school had a graduation rate
above 50%.500

As many, like Gary Roberts, have already pointed out with
much more bravado, college athletes technically aren’t
amateurs anyway because they get paid a scholarship.501 And,
according to Roberts, college sports’ popularity is not necessarily
greater because the athletes are only paid with “in-kind
academic services.”502 Others have argued that student-athletes
are more akin to employees, engaging in a work-study job for
which they receive scholarships but no other compensation.503
Amateurism, in the way the NCAA defined it (not getting paid),
is not the primary driver, but does have some procompetitive
purposes.504
4.

But Consumers Want a Product Distinct from the Pros

Even if our current, unique system appears to run afoul of
conceptions of free market regulations, studies show that
consumers of college sports in the U.S. want a product that is
distinct from professional sports.505 Arguments upholding the
need to maintain the “purity” of college sports do not fall on deaf
ears.506 Sports fans exist who will avidly watch and support
college football, but have little-to-no interest in NFL football,

500. Id.
501. See Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2658–59 (1996).
502. Id. at 2659.
503. See, e.g., John Fitzgerald, Like Students in Work-Study Programs,
NCAA Athletes Deserve Pay, Suit Says, 26 WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION, no. 10,
2019, at 01.
504. See Roberts, supra note 501, at 2639–46; O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at
1058–59.
505. Roberts, supra note 501, at 2642.
506. In 1946, the NCAA passed the “Purity Code,” which outlined
statements on, inter alia, amateurism, recruiting, and scholarships. SMITH,
supra note 80, at 93. In a somewhat inverted instance of history repeating
itself, the Southeastern Conference threatened to secede from the NCAA
because its member schools sought the right to pay players. Id. Ultimately, the
conference remained in the NCAA due to the popularity of the Purity Code and
a desire not to be ostracized. Id.
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due to a number of factors such as regional allegiances,507
alumni and family ties,508 and a dislike of the commercialization
and professional statuses (and attendant personas) that
accompany professional sports.509
In that sense, the conception of amateurism or having a
product that is distinct from professional sports is grounded in
tradition and appears to have value from a consumer
perspective in that it provides consumers of sports more choice
in their consumption.510 However, what we’re missing are
surveys and statistics showing the procompetitive effects and
benefits of amateurism.511 In O’Bannon I, the NCAA’s expert
witness, Dr. J. Michael Dennis, presented a study showing that
Americans “generally oppose[] the idea of paying college football
and basketball players,”512 but the district court dismissed its
findings as unreliable.513 But the district court did acknowledge,
and I agree, that some procompetitive value exists in
distinguishing between college and professional sports;514
whether or not we continue to call it “amateurism” is irrelevant.
B.

But It Doesn’t Mean They Shouldn’t Get Paid or Profit
from Commercializing Their NILs

Some procompetitive value exists in distinguishing college
from professional sports by providing consumers with an option
containing features not found in professional sports, as the
507. See, e.g., Jon Solomon, Alabama-Auburn Game Draws Overnight TV
Rating That’s 2nd Highest in College Football, AL.COM (Dec. 1, 2013, 2:28 PM),
https://perma.cc/KJ3H-6VHH (last updated Mar. 7, 2019, 6:58 AM) (noting the
Alabama-Auburn rivalry’s regional popularity).
508. See generally Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic
Success: An Application of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental
Variables, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18196, 2016),
https://perma.cc/8L4P-RF2H (PDF).
509. See Turned Off NFL Fans: ‘Too Angry, Too Commercialized and Too
Stupid Expensive’, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/R2H9-PQPL.
510. See Roberts, supra note 501, at 2642 (promoting greater consumer
choice through maintaining amateur sports).
511. See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (commenting
that almost all surveys have found that compensation rules do not develop
competitive balance).
512. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
513. Id.
514. Id. at 1005.
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district court in O’Bannon I explained, such as through “loyalty
to their alma mater or affinity for the school in their region of
the country.”515 Not paying the athletes, however, is not how we
foster those values in college sports.
If consumers of college sports preferred that
student-athletes “not be paid,” then the NCAA wouldn’t need a
rule requiring it or the authority to enforce it.516 As Roberts
explains, if the rule fixing compensation were repealed, schools
would only “pay” student-athletes what consumers would
tolerate.517 If amateurism really was the value we sought in
college sports, then colleges would “unilaterally” decide that the
highest commercial use would be to “maintain teams of
amateurs and not pay them.”518 The fact that the NCAA needs
the rule “belies the claim of consumer preference.”519 The
so-called procompetitive effect of not paying players is “just a
disguised argument that the free market does not maximize
consumer welfare by producing the highest quality product.”520
With respect to pay for play, the real question is how much
payment would the market tolerate before impacting consumer
demand. Without preliminary studies to test the market to
determine that threshold, it is possible to theorize, as the Ninth
Circuit did in O’Bannon, that larger payments might impact
consumer demand more than smaller payments.521 But
questionable studies attempt to show that fact.522 Consumers
already
tolerate
direct
payment-like
support
for
student-athletes, a list of benefits the Supreme Court
exhaustively listed.523
With respect to NIL commercialization and its ties to
consumer demand, even if there are aspects of the current
515. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1059 (citing O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at
977–78).
516. See Roberts, supra note 501, at 2633–35.
517. Id. at 2660.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing
studies that found consumers responded negatively to larger payments).
522. See id. (suggesting concerns with the NCAA’s survey about consumer
behavior).
523. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (2021).
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amateurism rules that we want to maintain, can we say with a
straight face that the student-athletes in big time college
athletic programs aren’t already commercialized just like
professional athletes (while also having to go to school)? The
student-athletes’ regulatory associations and broadcasting
partners treat them as almost the same product as professional
players for commercialization and advertising purposes.524 Isn’t
the large revenue structure and commercial nature of the
NCAA’s “nonprofit” enterprise contributing more to the erosion
of the purity of college sports than a student-athlete posting a
#ad on Instagram next to a sports drink or shoe, or, even more
collaboratively lucrative for all university constituents, next to
a university-sponsored sports drink, shoe, or student-owned
business?
A similar argument surrounded the “professionalization” of
the Olympics,525 when, in 1971, the Olympic Committee allowed
athletes to receive endorsement deals and stipends for their
training and participation526 (only, of course, after the
Committee realized that promoting the athletes and, thus, the
games, would bring additional revenue that would benefit all
participants).527 Though professional, Olympic-caliber athletes,
even from developed and well-performing countries, lament the
comparatively small stipend they receive for their intensive
training and participation. And allowing Olympic athletes to
profit off sponsorships and commercialize off their potentially
once-in-a-lifetime moment in the international sporting
spotlights did not seem to diminish the integrity or popularity
of the Olympics.528
524. See Adam R. Schaefer, Slam Dunk: The Case for an NCAA Antitrust
Exemption, 83 N.C. L. REV. 555, 560–61 (2005) (describing commercialism in
college sports).
525. See Olympics Chief Opposed to Pros, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1972),
https://perma.cc/K6S8-SA5E (expressing concerns over professional athletes
in the Olympics).
526. See How Olympic Athletes Make a Living, SPORTS MGMT. DEGREE
HUB, https://perma.cc/YPE2-73VG.
527. Olympics Chief Opposed to Pros, supra note 525.
528. After athlete endorsement restrictions were lifted, Olympic television
viewership climbed for both the Summer and Winter Olympics, peaking
during the 1996 (Atlanta) and 2002 (Salt Lake City) Olympics, respectively.
Historical TV Ratings for Past Olympic Broadcasts, NIELSEN (Aug. 6, 2008),
https://perma.cc/3L2J-VSSL.
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The appeal of the Olympics, similar to college sports, is the
connection to national pride and having an athlete represent a
viewer’s country in ancient, centuries-old feats of competition
against those who are considered the best in the world.529 Other
contributors, such as cheating by falsifying the ages of athletes,
supporting banned doping, or the abuse of underage athletes,
have contributed to critiques of its operations.530 But the
long-term impacts of the commercialization and resulting
professionalization of its athletes has not been one of those
critiques.531 And people still love the Olympics and love buying
a Wheaties box with a national hero on it for their kids.532
College sports fans would easily dish out $40 to wait in line
for a picture with Heisman Trophy winner and all-around cool
guy Joe Burrow; they waited in line for hours anyway just to see
him get off the team bus in the middle of the night533 after LSU
defeated Alabama in 2019.534 These student-athletes work
exceptionally hard, and some evidence suggests that the public
is growing more dissatisfied with a full athletic scholarship and
“cost of attendance.”535

529. See generally Ivo van Hilvoorde et al., How to Influence National
Pride? The Olympic Medal Index as a Unifying Narrative, 45 INT’L REV. SOCIO.
SPORT 87 (2010).
530. See Kayleigh Roberts, 15 of the Biggest Scandals in Olympics History,
HARPER’S BAZAAR (Feb. 11, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://perma.cc/S7N4-NQVC.
531. Id.
532. Perhaps the most iconic Wheaties box featured Caitlyn Jenner after
winning the gold medal in the decathlon over the U.S.S.R. in 1976. This box
has sold on Ebay in recent years for as much as $255. Sam Frizell, Bruce
Jenner Wheaties Boxes Are Selling for Hundreds on eBay, TIME (Apr. 17, 2015,
10:52 AM), https://perma.cc/83F8-M3RA.
533. See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 524, at 566–67 (noting how after most
away night games, athletes don’t get back to their dorms until early in the
morning).
534. Glenn Guilbeau, Around the SEC Column: Nov. 9, 2019—The Night
the Tide Died . . . for LSU, DAILY ADVERTISER (Nov. 15, 2019, 10:36 AM),
https://perma.cc/3GRU-NUPL (last updated Nov. 15, 2019, 11:57 AM).
535. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Council Approves Meals, Other
Student-Athlete
Well-Being
Rules,
NCAA
(Apr.
15,
2014),
https://perma.cc/NK6G-YFVX (detailing policy changes, like unlimited meal
plans, meant to benefit student-athletes’ health).
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C. Promoting Competitive Balance Could Be Valuable, but
Consumers Don’t Seem to Care About Competitive Balance in
College Sports
The U.S. Supreme Court and circuit courts, until O’Bannon
I, seemed to accept that these amateurism rules promote
“competitive balance” among participating colleges.536 Little
theoretical support exists linking amateurism to maintaining
“competitive balance” among participating collegiate athletics
programs, however.537 Amateurism may be just one factor
contributing to the goal of “competitive balance,” but one could
argue that competitive balance and equity among participating
institutions is itself a farce and hollow tenet, considering schools
funnel costs toward non-pay related services, like coaches,
facilities, and the like, which “negate[s] whatever equalizing
effect the NCAA’s restraints on student-athlete compensation
might have once had.”538 Nor does there appear to be any
thorough balancing of factors to ensure that the NCAA’s
amateurism enforcement rules are reasonable in promoting or
supporting that so-called “competitive balance.”539
In fact, college sports are more predictable and less
competitive than professional sports. Best friends Bill Belichick
and Nick Saban have won six Super Bowls and six National
Championships, respectively, but Saban’s winning percentage
at Alabama is considerably higher than Belichick’s at New
England: .881 to .720.540 During late October of the 2020 NFL
season, the largest NFL line541 was 19.5 between the Chiefs and

536. See e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119–20 (1984)
(describing the role and benefits of amateurism); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010,
1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing the NCAA’s efforts to maintain competitive
balance); Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting the
essentiality of amateurism for competitive balance in collegiate sports).
537. See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (expressing
concerns with the factual record and studies supporting “competitive
balance”).
538. Id. at 1059.
539. See id. (providing analysis but no clear factors or rules for defining
reasonableness in these circumstances).
540. See Nick Saban, SPORTS REFERENCE, https://perma.cc/KXA6-GBAG;
Bill Belichick, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, https://perma.cc/6BMT-4GRW.
541. Betting Lines Explained, ONLINE GAMBLING, https://perma.cc/J3MA6M4B (“A betting line is a form of wagering whereby the bookmaker or
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Jets, which, at the time, many would have considered the
league’s best against the worst.542 Seven of the fourteen games
that week had spreads of just four points or fewer.543
Comparatively, in college that same week, only thirteen out of
forty-four games had spreads of four points or fewer.544 The
largest spread was 31.5 points.545
In comparing winning percentages from the 2019–2020
seasons for collegiate and NBA basketball, the traditional four
college “powerhouse” schools, Duke (.806), Kansas (.903),
Kentucky (.806), and Gonzaga (.939), all had win percentages
well above NBA Conference Champions, the Lakers (.732) and
the Bucks (.767).546 Comparing women’s elite college basketball
programs to the WNBA’s two conference champions, the
Washington Mystics (.765) and the Connecticut Sun (.676),547
the college teams greatly outperformed the pros: UConn (1.000),
Baylor (.944), Oregon (.944), Stanford (.778), South Carolina
(1.000), Mississippi State (.813), and Gonzaga (.944).548
Others have decried the lack of competitiveness in college
sports. During the Senate Judiciary Hearings, the Executive
Director of the National College Players Association, Ramogi
Huma, testified that a “level playing field does not exist under
current NCAA rules” and that “college athletes shouldn’t be
forced to sacrifice their economic freedom and rights so the
NCAA and colleges can continue to pretend that a level playing

sportsbook set gambling odds and determine the favorite and underdog teams
in a match.”).
542. Jimmy Reinman, Jets Could Become 9th Team in NFL to Be 20+ Point
Underdogs, USA ONLINE SPORTSBOOKS (Oct. 29, 2020, 2:11 PM),
https://perma.cc/7D24-XRFF.
543. NFL Scores and Odds Archive, SPORTS BOOK REVS. ONLINE,
https://perma.cc/6YC7-S925.
544. NCAA Scores and Odds Archive, SPORTS BOOK REVS. ONLINE,
https://perma.cc/Z5Z7-776Y.
545. Id.
546. 2019–20 College Basketball Conference Standings, SPORTS
REFERENCE, https://perma.cc/62JU-QXW8; 2019–20 NBA Standings,
BASKETBALL REFERENCE, https://perma.cc/544K-W95Z.
547. Women’s National Basketball Association Standings 2019, ESPN,
https://perma.cc/G9US-557V.
548. Women’s College Basketball Standings2019–2020, ESPN,
https://perma.cc/Y7R8-P3XK.
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field exists.”549 The current NCAA football playoff system, for
example, while an attempt to bring some sense of competitive
balance to the NCAA football national championships, still only
invites four teams.550 But since the four-team playoff took effect
in 2015, only thirteen different teams have appeared in these
bowl games, with Alabama appearing in seven of the eight years
of the playoff, Clemson making six appearances, Oklahoma and
Ohio State each appearing four times, and Notre Dame making
two appearances.551
However, I am not convinced that consumers value
competitive balance in intercollegiate sports. In fact, I argue
that part of the appeal of college sports is its competitive
imbalance because it allows us to “root for the underdog,” since
it’s so rare to see a Stony Brook University, for example, make
it to the College World Series.552 It’s a shock when the
University of Alabama or Clemson University loses a football
game,553 or when Duke loses a basketball game.554 Consumers
say they care about competitive balance in the context of the
College Football Playoffs, but college sports fans also seem to

549. Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 1:09:20–1:10:06 (2020) (statement of Ramogi
Huma), https://perma.cc/5RU5-VQ2G. “In 2019, Ohio State earned $209
million in athletics revenue. Ohio University earned $28 million. Both are in
the FBS division. ESPN’s preseason rankings have Ohio State at number two
in the nation while Ohio University is ranked 90th.” Id.
550. About, COLL. FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, https://perma.cc/8JNS-J22Y.
551. Anthony Chiusano, Teams with the Most College Football Playoff
Wins and Appearances, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/VC9R-6VZB.
552. In 2012, the Stony Brook Seawolves made an improbable run through
the Miami Regional and Baton Rouge Super Regional on their way to the
College World Series in Omaha, Nebraska. Shock the World! Baseball Season
in Review, STONY BROOK ATHLETICS (July 27, 2012, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/BWL5-5V2M.
553. Paul Theroux, an American travel writer, wrote Deep South, in which
he reflected on Alabama’s “obsession” with its college football team.
Bryant-Denny stadium, at the time, was the eighth-largest sports field in the
world and bigger than any soccer stadium in Europe. PAUL THEROUX, DEEP
SOUTH (2015).
554. See, e.g., Shawn Krest, Coach K: “We Were Very Soft. I’m Extremely
Disappointed”, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/3SNXFHC5 (“Duke suffered a shocking loss at Miami to a Hurricanes team with just
seven scholarship players who had lost four straight games by at least a dozen
points each.”).
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relish the “upset.”555 Again, more research is needed to
determine whether consumers care about cheating and
competitive balance, or whether we prefer the competitive
imbalance of college sports because of the rare “Cinderella” story
narrative that can arise in college sports and the otherwise
longstanding tradition of “winning” that some powerhouses
exploit.
I do think that competitive balance could be a value
animating college sports, contrary to its current competitive
imbalance. Part of the issue in achieving competitive balance is
an inability to control the desire to win over the desire to play
fair.556 Heather Lyke, the Director of Athletics at the University
of Pittsburgh testified at the Senate Judiciary Hearing that she
opposed gambling on college sports and that “prop betting,” a
new type of bet in sports betting, opens the door to athletes
potentially receiving payment to throw games.557 A prop bet
wagers on how one particular player might perform in one
particular situation, e.g., will Joe Burrow pass for over or under
300 yards this game. Prop bets could be premised on virtually
any moment, such as one play or one pitch.558 Lyke’s concern is
not unfounded.559 Student-athletes who are already struggling
555. See Austin Lloyd, College Football: 5 Upsets That All Fans Want to
See in 2021, FANSIDED (Aug. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/XXC3-BM43 (“The
underdog is the one who is expected to fail; many college football fans like that
quality in the team(s) they root for.”).
556. See SMITH, supra note 80, at 208 (“As Homer’s Iliad showed three
millennia ago, humans love to compete and too often do it in unethical ways in
order to win.”).
557. Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 2:19:40–2:20:00 (2020) (statement of Heather
Lyke), https://perma.cc/5RU5-VQ2G.
558. Id.
559. All-American point guard, Stevin “Hedake” Smith, may be the
ultimate cautionary tale. A standout on the court and in the classroom (3.5
GPA), Smith was named the 1994 Arizona State Male Athlete of the Year.
However, after going into $10,000 of gambling debt, Smith started “throwing”
games for bookies to repay his debt. Although still scoring at a breakneck pace
(thirty-nine points on a conference-record ten three-pointers in one game), he
purposely played poor defense so that his team would fail to “cover the spread.”
The FBI caught wind after news spread throughout the Las Vegas sports
betting community and massive amounts were suddenly being bet against
Arizona State. See Richie Whitt, Mavs Ex ‘Headake’ Smith Offers Cautionary
Tale on Sports Gambling, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3JBV-9ZPQ; Stevin (Hedake) Smith, Confessions of a Point
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financially might see increased opportunities to engage in such
behavior for the potential financial benefits. However, as long
as gambling, winning, and competition are valued to sports
consumers, who are essentially betting on a game, incentives
will need to exist to curb the desire to cheat in order to win or
reap financial gains. Further, more studies are needed to
determine if consumers care about cheating and will watch less
sports if a salacious cheating scandal breaks. For now, it seems,
for college sports, all publicity is good publicity.
D.

The Heart of Amateurism: School Ties

Though college sports’ revenues are a big reason for their
modern day existence, many question why we play college sports
at all, “especially because there is no evidence that
intercollegiate athletics help[] to create and disseminate
knowledge.”560 Clotfelter examined the websites of fifty-two
large universities that collect substantial revenues from
intercollegiate athletics and found just four that mention
athletics in their mission statements.561 Most colleges play no
sports.562 Why expend the capital and expose the university to
potential reputational harm through bad actors in the athletics
programs? Clotfelter identified four roles for intercollegiate
athletics: (1) “a consumer good that students and alumni value,”
assisting with student recruiting; (2) “a business enterprise that
serves as an entrepreneurial outlet”; (3) a tool “for universities
to build support from constituencies”; and (4) “an educational
role, as intercollegiate sports may promote courage, effort,
fortitude, discipline, and teamwork and foster grace in winning
and losing.”563
Similar to the district court’s findings in O’Bannon I, that
amateurism serves a procompetitive purpose of “integrating

Shaver Former Arizona State Star Hedake Smith Reveals How He and His
Accomplices Fixed Basketball Games, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 9, 1998),
https://perma.cc/J586-4X7D.
560. Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 189 (citing CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 15 (2011)).
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id. (citing CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES 15 (2011)).
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academics and athletics” but not as a result of the NCAA’s
amateurism rules,564 I posit that the only distinction that
consumers should value in the context of the college sports
product is the athlete’s ties to and full-time enrollment in an
institution of higher learning. While untested, it is likely that
teams would be less attractive to consumers if they were
unaffiliated with colleges, similar to European club leagues. For
example, the University of Nebraska likely would generate more
interest in its football team than an unaffiliated club team in
the United States called the “Lincoln Cornhuskers.”565
But, as Roberts echoes, “I doubt that many football
consumers, who greatly enjoy games played by professionals
over twenty-two years of age, will be much less attracted to
games played by eighteen- to twenty-two-year-old athletes
because they are paid a salary.”566 Further extrapolating and
with a bit of lamentation, considering all of the publicity
attendant to violations,567 academic fraud,568 athletes who read
and write at third grade levels,569 “correspondence courses,”570
and other illicit payments to players (the University of
Tennessee was most recently exposed for outright paying its
football players in 2020),571 and the still continued popularity of
564. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
565. Roberts, supra note 501, at 2659.
566. Id.
567. Widely publicized outrage over violations goes back more than a
century. See, e.g., Collegiate Reformers to Control Athletics, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
1, 1906), https://perma.cc/5R6T-TMTM.
568. From 2014–2018 among Division I schools, the NCAA found thirty
violations of “Academic Certification” and twenty-four violations involving
“Academic Misconduct.” NCAA, DIVISION I INFRACTIONS ANNUAL REPORT 17
(May 2019), https://perma.cc/AB27-8UVX (PDF).
569. “[A] CNN investigation [of twenty-one schools] revealed that most
schools have between 7% and 18% of revenue sport athletes who are reading
at an elementary school level.” Sara Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some College
Athletes Play Like Adults, Read Like 5th-Graders, CNN (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:05
PM), https://perma.cc/4QSX-8NGZ. Moreover, “of 183 UNC-Chapel Hill
athletes who played football or basketball from 2004 to 2012 . . . [one
researcher] found that 60% read between fourth- and eighth-grade levels.
Between 8% and 10% read below a third-grade level.” Id.
570. See generally Doug Lederman, NCAA Punishes Missouri in Blatant
Academic
Fraud
Case,
INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Feb.
1,
2019),
https://perma.cc/9YBK-V7BQ.
571. As of January 18, 2021, no sanctions had yet come down, but
Tennessee fired its head football coach, Jeremy Pruitt for cause, voiding his
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college sports, it seems the only animating factor is the
connection to the school, and not necessarily that the
student-athletes and college universities benefit from dual
academic-athletic enrollment.572
Paying student-athletes might also alleviate many of the
socioeconomic hardships faced by the athletes and their
families, producing a positive outcome on the student-athletes
themselves (incentivizing them to stay in school longer,
benefitting from the rigor of dual academic-athletic training,
shifting the focus truly back to the academic benefits of
providing one’s athletic abilities in exchange for a college
education).573 This benefits society as well by preparing
student-athletes for a life after sports, enabling them to
contribute financially to their families, economies, and schools.
Both the universities and the students could benefit from
cross promotion. As universities are continually on the hunt for
“their Gatorade,” a sports drink tied to the University of
Florida,574 universities seeking to commercialize their own
faculty and staff research initiatives could leverage the images
of their star student-athletes on a mutually beneficial individual
or group basis to promote such research.
The only value that should thus animate amateurism from
a consumer perspective is that the student-athletes are fully
enrolled students at the university, with some eligibility
limitations on those who played their sport professionally before
playing that sport for the university. Recall here the case of
Jeremy Bloom, the Olympic skier who lost his eligibility to play
$12.6 million contractual buyout. Blake Toppmeyer, Jeremy Pruitt Fired as
Tennessee Football Coach for Cause After Internal Investigation, KNOXVILLE
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2021, 12:15 PM), https://perma.cc/2X9S-Z3E8.
572. See Roberts, supra note 501, at 2659 (noting that the popularity of
collegiate sports is due less to player’s academic status and more to school ties).
573. See supra Part I.
574. See The Legend of Gatorade, YOUTUBE at 2:012:24 (Jan. 7, 2008),
https://perma.cc/G5KX-YWW8 (crediting Gatorade for Florida’s 1967 Orange
Bowl win over Georgia Tech).
The problem for the [University of Florida] Gators was that they
expended so much energy early in the game, that they had none left
for the end. So we devised a drink of carbohydrate and electrolytes
that speeds into the system and supplies everything they need for
energy production. Naturally we named it Gator-ade.
Id. at 1:021:21.
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college football for CU because of his skiing endorsements.575 I,
among many others, disagree with the outcome of the Bloom
case and the subsequent gerrymandering of NCAA rules to
incorporate its precedent onto men’s skiing regulations.576 Mr.
Bloom should have been able to play NCAA football.
Further, in agreement with O’Bannon and in line with the
mentality of Japanese high school baseball coaches, value exists
to both the student-athletes and the public in integrating
athletics and academics: “There is very little levity that comes
with playing high school baseball at a high level in Japan; it is
a task filled with regimented training and complete devotion,
heavy responsibility and historical accountability.”577 Similarly,
student-athletes in the United States understand the long
tradition in which they play, relish in the decades-old rivalries
between regional schools, and because of those loyalties and
traditions undertake sacrifices to glimpse the lights of the
stadium during a night game. The benefits to the
student-athletes can be more comprehensive than just focusing
on and training on their sport.
IV. REASSESSING AMATEURISM UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
Technology changes rapidly, but human nature,
if it changes at all, moves at glacial speed.
Ronald A. Smith578
Theorizing that the value of amateurism lies in an athlete’s
connection to and enrollment in an institution of higher
learning, and potentially competitive balance, the normative
implications of this finding impact both the current analysis of
amateurism under the rule of reason and a potentially more
robust, ethical application in action. In using this new definition
575. Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622–23 (Colo. App. 2004).
576. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 7, §§ 12.1.2, 12.2.1–12.2.3, 12.2.5,
12.8.3 (creating exceptions for skiing to the NCAA’s amateurism rules).
577. Tim Keown, New Baseball Film Captures the Tournament that Made
Shohei Ohtani, Yusei Kikuchi Stars, ESPN (Jun. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/MHZ9-6LG2. “Every baseball field in Japan is considered
sacred ground, and before each game the players gather in a ruler-straight line
in front of their dugouts and bow to the earth to thank it for providing the
canvas for their endeavor.” Id.
578. SMITH, supra note 80, at 208.
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of amateurism under a strict antitrust framework, one can more
appropriately respond to the Ninth Circuit’s insightful question
in O’Bannon II of whether small payments to players would
impact consumer preference as opposed to not paying them at
all.579 One could also respond to the thornier questions of
potentially paying players larger sums and how to allow full NIL
commercialization on the free market consistent with antitrust
values.
A.

Proposed Distributions Schemes for Pay for Play

If we accept that consumers likely do not care about
whether athletes are paid, then the question of how to
compensate athletes becomes one of a “less restrictive
alternative” that still promotes the value of amateurism. While
fair-market-based
approaches
for
compensating
student-athletes based on the value of their contributions to
their division might be equitable toward individual players in
certain sports, as the plaintiffs in Alston argued,580 I posit
instead that one should first determine the fair market value of
each student-athlete based on sport and gender within each
conference, and then distribute such payments in equal
amounts to each eligible student-athlete within each conference
at the end of an academic year or other set timeline.581
Considering some of the hardships that student-athletes face in
season, however, I could be convinced that institutions and
conferences should pay them on a monthly or even biweekly
basis.
If we removed all restraints on paying student‑athletes and
allowed them to negotiate for and receive the fair market value
of their services, one study found that FBS football and men’s
basketball players would have earned at least $6.2 billion

579. See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2015).
580. See generally Expert Report and Affidavit of Daniel A. Rascher, Ph.D.,
In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:14-md-02541), 2016 WL 3671671; Schwarz, supra note
33.
581. See O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (outlining
the different hypothetical scenarios that the trial court’s injunction would
prohibit).
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between 2011 and 2015.582 While the average full athletic
scholarship was worth approximately $23,204 per year, the
study estimated the average annual fair market value of “big
time college football and men’s basketball players to be $137,357
and $289,031, respectively. . . . Ultimately, football players
receive about 17% of their fair market value while men’s
basketball players receive approximately 8% of theirs.”583
Would we be comfortable with that level of compensation
for student-athletes, i.e., would consumers stop watching if we
paid Division I men’s basketball players over $200,000 a year?
What if it was lower, or substantially lower, like $10,000 a
season? In 2014, the district court in O’Bannon I seemed to
suggest, based on one expert’s testimony, that $5,000 put into a
trust for a student-athlete to receive after graduation for each
year of play might be reasonable.584 But that portion was
reversed on appeal.585 The NCAA’s study, which the district
court in O’Bannon I weighed lightly,586 did provide some
probative value in showing that 53 percent of the public is less
likely to watch or attend games if star players are paid more
than non-stars.587
Finally, while dominant law and economics theories strip
economic rules of morality considerations, focusing solely on
economic efficiency from a consumer welfare perspective, Stucke
582. See RAMOJI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE $6 BILLION HEIST:
ROBBING COLLEGE ATHLETES UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 3 (2012),
https://perma.cc/8GTE-CWWW (PDF).
583. Id.
In 2011, the NFL reached an agreement with players that they
would share at least 46.5% of the revenue generated by the league
while the NBA owners agreed to a 50% revenue-sharing standard
for its players. Those standards were applied to the revenue
reported by colleges’ and universities’ football and basketball
revenues to better gauge the value of the college players that
participate in these sports.
Id. at 12.
584. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1006–07.
585. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 107879.
586. See O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975–76 (“These responses suggest
that some respondents did not understand or did not take seriously some of
the survey questions and illustrate the limits of Dr. Dennis’s conclusions.”).
587. Transcript of Testimony of Defendants’ Expert, John Dennis at 2664,
O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), ECF No. 267,
https://perma.cc/VC98-KGCS (PDF).
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argues that antitrust rules and economic safeguards should
(and arguably already do) have a basis in morality and what the
public perceives as acceptable and fair behavior.588 Antitrust
doctrine is not the only body of law regulating college athletes.
Title IX also requires equal opportunities and funds for men’s
and women’s college sports.589 Simply paying all
student-athletes their free-market value would likely run afoul
of this requirement,590 as well as fail to address many of the
inequities facing the majority of student-athletes who do not
play men’s football or basketball at a Division I conference
school.591
Setting the fair market value per player by conference also
maintains the existing competitiveness of the conferences and
at least attempts to promote competitiveness more directly than
amateurism’s current rules. Conferences have regional alliances
and loyalties at heart and have already historically impacted
NCAA rules in furtherance of players’ well-beings and in the
name of promoting competition when working in concert.592 An
equal payment to all student-athletes at an institution and
within a conference takes those equitable and moral factors into
account, in the way the NCAA purports to do.593
B.

Proposed Application to NIL Commercialization

#bringbackncaafootball. Consumers are demanding
student-athlete NIL commercialization.594 And under this new
definition of amateurism, student-athletes should be able to
588. See Steinbaum & Stucke, supra note 75, at 598–99.
589. See Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”).
590. But see Schwarz, supra note 33, at 59–62 (contesting that payments
would violate Title IX and analyzing the impact of proposed payment
schemes).
591. See supra Parts III.
592. See Sanderson & Siegfried, supra note 9, at 187, 192, 203.
593. See Sundram, supra note 62, at 569 (“This tradeoff [of balancing
athlete notoriety and payment amount considerations] is necessary to preserve
the spirit of amateurism and allow the NCAA to distinguish itself from
professional leagues.”).
594. #bringbackncaafootball, TWITTER, https://perma.cc/3Z43-W6F7.
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commercialize their names, images, and likenesses while
enrolled in college. The NCAA is moving in this direction, but
begrudgingly and only in response to concerted state action.
Student-athletes should be able to receive compensation for the
use of their NILs on both a group licensing and individual basis,
with some mentorship and guidance.
Less
restrictive
alternatives
exist
regarding
student-athlete NIL commercialization that would still promote
and
preserve
dual
academic-athletic
enrollment.
Student-athletes should be able to share in the
commercialization of their names, images, and likenesses, on
both a group licensing basis and an individual basis.
Student-athletes should have an active role in negotiating for
and a share in the commercialization of their NILs. As
previously implicated in Part II, student-athletes are, in fact,
invested in and have proven capable of organizing and
negotiating on their own behalf.
In 2015, Northwestern University football players
attempted to unionize, and the National Labor Relations
Board’s (NLRB) Chicago regional director initially determined
that the players were “employees” under the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935,595 thus giving the players the right to
bargain collectively and obtain union representation.596 The full
NLRB vacated this decision because it lacked jurisdiction,
emphasizing that it could not decide whether college athletes
were employees because it only has jurisdiction over private
employers.597 Given the “symbiotic” relationship between the
NCAA, the various conferences, and member schools, the NLRB
lacked sufficient jurisdiction to allow the private schools to
unionize.598
The implications that student‑athletes should not receive a
share of group licensing deals or that conferences are best suited
to negotiate for group licensing without student-athletes’ input
are simply incorrect. Student-athletes should become
stakeholders in such conference group licensing deals, not only
as third-party beneficiaries in the receipt of funds, but also as

595.
596.
597.
598.

29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (defining “employee”).
Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1356 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 1353–54.
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parties to the original negotiation. Such representation at the
initial deal stage could also potentially increase overall licensing
and advertising revenue because of the strong negotiating power
any organized student-athlete group could leverage after such
initial rule changes.
As the California and other state acts implore,
student-athletes should also be allowed to commercialize their
own NILs on an individual basis while in college. With some
training and guidance, student-athletes are more than capable
of actively or passively commercializing their NILs. Further,
institutions should proactively advise student-athletes of their
legal rights or provide authorized agents, 599 as well as subject
all student-athletes to a rigorous overview on commercialization
and endorsement deals.600 Notably, the California act allows an
institution to prevent a student-athlete from accepting a deal or
promotion that might conflict with an institutional deal.601 This
broad
exception
could
theoretically
disempower
student-athletes who might want to promote, for example, a
local or start-up athletic shoe designer.602 To account for
potential conflicts between the institution and a
student-athlete’s individual promotion, such individual deals
should be brought before a conflicts committee. Such a
committee ideally would include institutional, athletics’
compliance, legal, and student-athlete representation. For
example, it might carve out a regional advertising or
promotional market for a promotion of a local shoe designer.
But because of a student-athlete’s ties to a particular school,
such a committee could also consider the ethical and moral
implications of a student-athlete’s individual deal. Though it is
questionable whether consumers care about the tawdry and
often salacious stories surrounding, for example, recruiting
violations, playing for a school and representing something
larger than oneself might require imposing some morality-based
599. See Sundram, supra note 62, at 567 (arguing that lawyers should be
provided to athletes without cost).
600. Some state NIL statutes already require that universities provide
student-athletes with mentorship and financial guidance. See, e.g., H.B. 404,
2021 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021).
601. S.B. 206, 2079 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (codified at Cal. Educ. Code
§ 67456).
602. See Bank, supra note 17, at 112.
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limits. For instance, should a student-athlete be allowed to
promote a sport-betting app or a local strip club? Again, I’m not
entirely convinced that the public would care overall, but
regionally based consumers might, and more research needs to
be conducted on whether general and regional consumers care
about the ethical morals of their players.
C.

Counterarguments: Testing This Theory

The amateurism rule is outdated and exploitative. It needs
reassessment. And right now, everyone from the Senate to the
Supreme Court, to the NCAA and its member institutions are
exploring how to end the inequity. The arguments posed in this
Article are meant to inform all such potential policymakers and
stakeholders, with an understanding that its theories are
untested and need further study. But here I’d like to address
some potential counterarguments to this Article’s approach.
1.

Antitrust Is the Appropriate Approach.

Because of the strict rigidity of and sole theoretical concern
for consumer value, one could argue that antitrust doctrine is
not the appropriate approach to remedy the inequities of the
current distribution system. While the antitrust rule of reason
analysis might focus solely on consumer preference, the fact
remains that the Sherman Act’s jurisdiction includes contracts
made in restraint of trade.603 In any other context, these claims
would fall under the Sherman Act.604 Just because we’ve always
exempted them or just because we have students as a
stakeholder instead of professionals does not mean that
antitrust reasoning is inapplicable.605
Not only is antitrust law the appropriate approach, but
utilizing it appropriately can disrupt the current payment
schemes. By reassessing the definition of amateurism under a
rule of reason analysis, judicial doctrine or policy makers can
establish a floor of acceptable limitations below which the NCAA
and any other association governing college athletes cannot fall.
603. Edelman, supra note 335, at 70–71.
604. See id. at 82.
605. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct 2141, 2162 (2021) (applying the rule of
reason when evaluating rules limiting education-related benefits).
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After that, the concern for judicial rewriting of amateurism
rules will have less impact because the NCAA, its member
institutions, and other interested constituents (including
student-athletes) will implement rules that the market will
likely respond to regardless. If the NCAA and its member
institutions fail to rewrite its amateurism rules, I have little
doubt that competing associations, potentially with support
from state legislatures, will emerge to rival the NCAA.606 One
way or another, the market will cause the NCAA to change its
ways, and the most powerful weapon in this war of attrition
could be antitrust law. But, again, if used correctly.
2.

You’re Not Just a Joint Venture; You’re a Cartel.

Despite the NCAA’s arguments in its petition to the
Supreme Court that its ruling would impact not only the NCAA
but all future agreements between contracting parties,607 that
might not be a negative outcome of judicial precedent. The
NCAA’s agreement with its member institutions might be
considered a joint venture, but that does not exempt it from
antitrust laws, especially when the joint venture operates like
an impermissible cartel—exactly the type of behavior antitrust
law was created to deter.608 If such a ruling impacts all future
cartels from exploiting their labor market, maybe that is
precisely what we want.
3.

We Can Still Maintain Distinctions between College and
Professional Sports.

Although the Ninth Circuit admonishes that not paying
players “is precisely what makes them amateurs,” 609 and others
might agree with that, we don’t know that for sure from a
consumer perspective. The Ninth Circuit was right that the
606. See, e.g., J. Brady McCollough, Forget the NCAA: Startup Basketball
League to Offer Prep Players Pay, Plus Education, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019,
9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/D9MF-E63X (reporting on “a college basketball
league that would challenge the NCAA by offering salaries ranging from
$50,000 to $150,000 to the top prep players nationally and internationally,
while setting them up with a clear path to higher education”).
607. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at 31.
608. See Steinbaum & Stucke, supra note 75, at 596.
609. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d 1049, at 1076–78 (9th Cir. 2015).
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exact studies we need to support the theory I posit in this Article
do not exist.610 But without them, I also do not think that the
Ninth Circuit can reasonably continue to say that amateurism
equals no compensation. Further, we can still maintain the
features of college sports that consumers value and that
distinguish them from pro sports. And we can do it in a way that
might encourage student-athletes to stay in school longer,
graduate, and emerge with practical and professional life skills.
CONCLUSION
The time to reassess what it means to be a student-athlete
in America is nigh. For over a century, we’ve simply gotten it
wrong. At this critical juncture in our social, cultural, and
economic progress, the time is now to protect student-athletes
from exploitation by simply allowing them to receive
appropriate compensation. We have all the tools in front of us to
get it right this time around, or at least to take the step in the
right direction. Amateurism does not and should not bar
student-athletes from receiving compensation or from
commercializing their own names, images, and likenesses.

610. See id. at 1076–79 (discussing the “meager evidence in the record”
demonstrating whether payments will preserve amateurism and consumer
demand).

